Right to Confrontation / Interpreter

As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution (Ho Wai Pang vs. People, G.R. No. 176229. October 19, 2011).

Custodial Investigation

As the Court held in People v. Buluran, “[a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.” As the Court held in People v. Buluran, “[a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.” (Ho Wai Pang vs. People, G.R. No. 176229. October 19, 2011)

Consequential Damages

Besides, consequential damages, such as loss of profits on account of delay or failure of delivery, may be recovered only if such damages were reasonably foreseen or have been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting. Considering the nature of the obligation in the instant case, respondent ABB, at the time it agreed to repair petitioner’s Kiln Drive Motor, could not have reasonably foreseen that it would be made liable for production loss, labor cost and rental of the crane in case it fails to repair the motor or incurs delay in delivering the same, especially since the motor under repair was a spare motor (Continental Cement v. Asea Brown Boveri, G.R. No. 171660, October 12, 2011).

No Extrajudicial Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza, the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other; ratifying a document entitled “Legal Separation” where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each other; preparing a document authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against the other; and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved (Espinosa v. Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011)

Attack from Relative

Moreover, the accused was the nephew of the victim’s wife; thus, an attack from a relative right in their own home was unexpected. Since the accused was not a stranger to the spouses, the wife did not immediately demand that he leave as soon as she saw him enter the kitchen (People v. Agcanas, G.R. No. 174476, October 11, 2011)

Estoppel / Nuisance Per Se

Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires.

We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan (Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011).

Chain of Custody

In Zaragga v. People, we held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. Thus, the accused were acquitted due to the prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu. In People v. Sitco, we enumerated other occasions wherein acquittal was proper for failure of the prosecution to establish a complete chain of custody, such as:

In a string of cases, we declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before it was finally offered in court, fatally conflicts with every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused.

As in People v. Partoza, this case suffers from the failure of the prosecution witness to provide the details establishing an unbroken chain of custody. In Partoza, the police officer testifying did not relate to whom the custody of the drugs was turned over. The evidence of the prosecution likewise did not disclose the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. (People v. Ulat, G.R.No. 180504, December 5, 2011)

The prosecution failed to show how SPO1 Pamor ensured the integrity of the seized items from the time it was entrusted to him at the place of confiscation until the team reached the police station until he eventually handed them over again to PO2 Lagmay for the marking of the sachets. Neither did the prosecution show to whom the confiscated articles were turned over and the manner they were preserved after the laboratory examination and until their final presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Clearly, these lapses raise doubt on the integrity and identity of the drugs presented as evidence in court.

Further, on the basis of the testimony of PO2 Lagmay, the confiscated items were not immediately marked at the scene of the crime. More significantly, although these items were allegedly marked in the police station, there was no showing that it was done in the presence of the accused-appellant or his chosen representative (People of the Philippines Vs. Jose Alex Secreto, G.R. No. 198115. February 27, 2013).