Inverse Condemnation Proceedings

The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided in its decision. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC’s entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC’s entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted (National Power Corporation Vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011).

Bigamy

Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining prescription. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage (Cenon R. Teves Vs. People of the Philippines and Danilo R. Bongalon, G.R. No. 188775. August 24, 2011).

Special Administrator

The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or intestate proceeding.

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion (Diosdado S. Manungas Vs. Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreño, G.R. No. 193161. August 22, 2011).

Special Administrator

The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or intestate proceeding.

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion (Diosdado S. Manungas Vs. Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreño, G.R. No. 193161. August 22, 2011).

Special Administrator

The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or intestate proceeding.

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion (Diosdado S. Manungas Vs. Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreño, G.R. No. 193161. August 22, 2011).

Civil Obligation vs. Employee Relations

In Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. Staff Retirement Plan (HSBC SRP) v. Spouses Broqueza, which involved the dismissed co-employees of herein petitioner Ana who were also unable to pay the monthly amortizations of their respective loans, and despite HSBC SRP's demand for them to pay their loan, they still failed to pay their loan obligations, We said, among others, that the enforcement of a loan agreement involves debtor-creditor relations founded on contracts and does not in any way concern employee relations (Ma. Ana M. Tamonte and Edilberto A. Tamonte Vs. Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd., et al., G.R. No. 166970. August 17, 2011).

Cause of Action

Standard’s allegation in its amended complaint that RCJ is the registered owner of the passenger bus with plate number NYG 363 was sufficient to state a cause of action against RCJ. The registered owner of a vehicle should be primarily responsible to the public for injuries caused while the vehicle is in use. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner (RCJ bus Lines, Inc. Vs. Standard Insurance Company Incorporated, G.R. No. 193629. August 17, 2011).

Special Appearance

It does not escape our attention though that Cheng Lie’s pleadings do not indicate that the same were filed by way of special appearance. But these, to our mind, are mere inaccuracies in the title of the pleadings. What is important are the allegations contained therein which consistently resisted the jurisdiction of the trial court. Thus, Cheng Lie cannot be considered to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the courts (Atiko Trnas, Inc., et al. Vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 167545. August 17, 2011).

Masiador and Sentenciador

As found by both the NLRC and the CA, respondents had no part in petitioners’ selection and management; petitioners’ compensation was paid out of the arriba(which is a percentage deducted from the total bets), not by petitioners; and petitioners performed their functions as masiador and sentenciador free from the direction and control of respondents. In the conduct of their work, petitioners relied mainly on their “expertise that is characteristic of the cockfight gambling,” and were never given by respondents any tool needed for the performance of their work.

Respondents, not being petitioners’ employers, could never have dismissed, legally or illegally, petitioners, since respondents were without power or prerogative to do so in the first place (Marticio Semblante and Dubrick Pilar Vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 196426. August 15, 2011).

Intervention

Moreover, considering that CSMC's interest is limited only to the operation of the subject machineries pursuant to its lease contract with SSC, its intervention would not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of SSC and IEB. CSMC's intervention should be treated as one pro interesse suo which is a mode of intervention in equity wherein a stranger desires to intervene for the purpose of asserting a property right in the res, or thing, which is the subject matter of the litigation, without becoming a formal plaintiff or defendant, and without acquiring control over the course of a litigation, which is conceded to the main actors therein (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, substituted by Meridian Corporation Vs. International Exchange Bank/Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Vs. International Exchange Bank, G.R. No. 176008/G.R. No. 176131. August 10, 2011).

Conspiracy

Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col’s actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.

Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.

Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop (People of the Philippines Vs. Michael Bokingo and Reynante Col, G.R. No. 187536. August 10, 2011)

Admission in Preliminary Examination

In People v. Sunga, we held that “the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed ‘critical stages’ in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution.” In said case, Sunga made an uncounselled admission before the police. He later acknowledged the same admission before the judge in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latter’s lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga’s rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held inadmissible. In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession was taken before a judge (People of the Philippines Vs. Michael Bokingo and Reynante Col, G.R. No. 187536. August 10, 2011)

Chain of Custody; Photograph; Stipulation

That the defense admitted the existence of the Booking and Information Sheet (Exh. “C”), the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exh. “D”) and Physical Science Report No. D-1331-02 (Exh. “E”) during the pre-trial did not amount to an admission of the identity of the seized specimen. What the admissions proved were merely the existence and authenticity of the request for laboratory examination and the result of this examination, not the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of evidence. Simply put, the admission regarding the existence of Exhibits “C,” “D” and “E” has no bearing on the question of whether the specimen submitted for chemical analysis was the same as that seized from the appellant. To interpret the stipulations as an admission that the appellant was the source of the specimen would be contrary to the pre-trial order (stating that Exhibits “C”, “D” and “E” were admitted as to their existence only and not as to the source); it would also bind the appellant to an unceremonious withdrawal of his plea of not guilty.

In like manner, the stipulation during the pre-trial regarding the non-presentation of the forensic chemist, P/Insp. Gural, merely covers the handling of the specimen at the forensic laboratory and the result of the examination, but not the manner the specimen was handled before it came to the possession of the forensic chemist and after it left his possession.

Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, the Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974. Section 1 of this Regulation requires the apprehending team, having initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to immediately inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused and/or his representatives, who shall be required to sign and be given copies of the inventory.

After the passage of R.A. No. 9165, the Court did not waver in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drugs were observed. In People v. Rosemarie R. Salonga, we acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to inventory and photograph the confiscated items. We also reversed the accused’s conviction in Gutierrez, for the failure of the buy-bust team to inventory and photograph the seized items without justifiable grounds. People v. Cantalejo also resulted in an acquittal because no inventory or photograph was ever made by the police.

We reached the same conclusions in the recent cases of People v. Erlinda Capuno y Tison, People v. Jay Lorena y Labag, and People v. Arnold Martinez y Angeles, et al.

Back Salaries

To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated.

A careful reading of these cases would reveal that a strict observance of the second condition for an award of back salaries becomes important only if the employee is not totally innocent of any administrative infraction. As previously discussed, where the employee is completely exonerated of the administrative charge or acquitted in the criminal case arising from the same facts based on a finding of innocence, the second requirement becomes subsumed in the first. Otherwise, a determination of the act/s and offense/s actually committed and of the corresponding penalty imposed has to be made.

On the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is met upon a showing that the separation from office is not warranted under the circumstances because the government employee gave no cause for suspension or dismissal. This squarely applies in cases where the government employee did not commit the offense charged, punishable by suspension or dismissal (total exoneration); or the government employee is found guilty of another offense for an act different from that for which he was charged (The Civil Service Commission Vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858. August 9, 2011).

Regular Employment

The appellate court's premise that regular employees are those who perform activities which are desirable and necessary for the business of the employer is not determinative in this case. In fact, any agreement may provide that one party shall render services for and in behalf of another, no matter how necessary for the latter's business, even without being hired as an employee. Hence, respondent's length of service and petitioner's repeated act of assigning respondent some tasks to be performed did not result to respondent's entitlement to the rights and privileges of a regular employee.

Furthermore, despite the fact that petitioner made use of the services of respondent for eleven years, he still cannot be considered as a regular employee of petitioner. Article 280 of the Labor Code, in which the lower court used to buttress its findings that respondent became a regular employee of the petitioner, is not applicable in the case at bar. Indeed, the Court has ruled that said provision is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment relationship because it merely distinguishes between two kinds of employees, i.e., regular employees and casual employees, for purposes of determining the right of an employee to certain benefits, to join or form a union, or to security of tenure; it does not apply where the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute (Atok Big Wedge Company, Inc. Vs. Jesus P. Gison, G.R. No. 169510. August 8, 2011).

Verification by Daughter

In this case, we find that the petition’s verification substantially complied with the requirements of the rules. The SPA authorized Bello-Ona to represent Bello in the case entitled “Francis Bello v. Bonifacio Security Services, Inc. and/or Samuel Tomas, (CA) Case No. 047829-06; NLRC-N[CR] Case No. 00-11-09529-2002”[1][18] – the case from which the present petition originated. As the daughter of Bello, Bello-Ona is deemed to have sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition, which are matters of record in the tribunals and the appellate court below (Francis Bello, represented herein by his daughter and attorney-in-fact, Geraldine Bello-Ona Vs. Bonifacio Security Services, Inc. and Samuel Tomas, G.R. No. 188086. August 3, 2011).

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Replevin Bond

In Jao v. Royal Financing Corporation, the Court held that defendant therein was precluded from claiming damages against the surety bond since defendant failed to file the application for damages before the termination of the case (Advent Capital and Finance Corporation Vs. Roland Young, G.R. No. 183018. August 3, 2011).

Failure to Prosecute

The dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute results in the restoration of the parties’ status prior to litigation, as if no complaint was filed at all. To let the writ of seizure stand after the dismissal of the complaint would be adjudging Advent as the prevailing party, when precisely no decision on the merits had been rendered. Accordingly, the parties must be reverted to their status quo ante. Since Young possessed the subject car before the filing of the replevin case, the same must be returned to him, as if no complaint was filed at all (Advent Capital and Finance Corporation Vs. Roland Young, G.R. No. 183018. August 3, 2011).

Floating Status

Traditionally invoked by security agencies when guards are temporarily sidelined from duty while waiting to be transferred or assigned to a new post or client, Article 286 of the Labor Codehas been applied to other industries when, as a consequence of the bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking, an employer is constrained to put employees on floating status for a period not exceeding six months. In brushing aside respondents’ reliance on said provision to justify the act of putting Leynes on floating status, the CA ruled that no evidence was adduced to show that there was a bona fide suspension of NHPI’s business. What said court clearly overlooked, however, is the fact that NHPI had belatedly ventured into building management and, with BGCC as its only client in said undertaking, had no other Property Manager position available to Leynes (Nippon Housing Phil. Inc., and/or Yasuhiro Kawata Vs. Maiah Angela Leynes, G.R. No. 177816. August 3, 2011).