Quasi-Delict

Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that night, Antonio should have been prudent to reduce his speed and increase his distance from the Pathfinder. Had he done so, it would be improbable for him to have hit the vehicle in front of him or if he really could not avoid hitting it, prevent such extensive wreck to the vehicle in front. With the glaring evidence, he obviously failed to exercise proper care in his driving.

Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused (Crix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (Formerly Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance) Vs. Minors: Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and Marikris, All surnamed Mangalinao y Dizon, et al. Sonny Li and Antonio Delos Santos Vs. Minors: Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and Marikris, All Surnamed Mangalinao Y Dizon, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 174089. January 25, 2012).

Refused to Receive

In Bughaw v. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation, this Court, in verifying the veracity of the allegation that respondent refused to receive the Notice of Termination, essentially looked for the following: (1) affidavit of service stating the reason for failure to serve the notice upon the recipient; and (2) a notation to that effect, which shall be written on the notice itself (Mansion Printing Center and Clement Cheng Vs. Diosdado Bitara, Jr., G.R. No. 168120. January 25, 2012).

Valid Dismissal - Conviction

The petitioner’s argument is not novel. It has been raised and rejected many times before on the basis that neither conviction beyond reasonable doubt for a crime against the employer nor acquittal after criminal prosecution was indispensable. Nor was a formal charge in court for the acts prejudicial to the interest of the employer a pre-requisite for a valid dismissal (Lolita S. Concepcion Vs. Minex Import Corporation/Minerama Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 153569. January 24, 2012).

Supervisory Power of RTC - Quashal of Writ of Execution

Neither can We affirm petitioner's contention that in seeking the quashal of the writ of possession, the respondents were, in effect, asking the RTC to abrogate its decision, which had already attained finality. As correctly observed by the CA, the quashal of a writ of possession does not have the effect of modifying or abrogating the judgment of the RTC. “The settled rule is that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and hence may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes – all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest.” To reiterate, however, the court's power with regard to execution of judgments extends only to properties irrefutably belonging to the judgment debtor, which does not obtain in this case.

Therefore, petitioner's contention that the writ of possession had already been enforced and can no longer be quashed deserves scant consideration. Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory control over the entire execution process, and such authority carries with it the right to determine every question which may be invariably involved in the execution. Respondents invoked this supervisory power when they sought the quashal of the writ of possession (Vashdeo Gagoomal Vs. Spouses Ramon and Natividad Villacorta, G.R. No. 192813. January 18, 2012).

Lis Pendens

The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a dual effect: (1) to keep the property subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or otherwise, of the property subject of the litigation to the judgment that the court will subsequently promulgate.

Thus, a notice of lis pendens is only valid and effective when it affects title over or right of possession of a real property.

In this case, it cannot be denied that Civil Case No. 67381, which RAM, predecessor-in-interest of petitioner, instituted against Zeñarosa was for collection of sum of money with damages – a purely personal action. Hence, the notice of lis pendens in favor of RAM annotated on the cancelled TCT No. 170213 and carried over to Tan's TCT No. 10206 conferred upon it no rights over the subject property and, as a necessary consequence, upon petitioner, its successor-in-interest (Vashdeo Gagoomal Vs. Spouses Ramon and Natividad Villacorta, G.R. No. 192813. January 18, 2012).

Sufficiency of Allegation in Information

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their bodies “which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations (People of the Philippines Vs. PO2 Eduardo Valdez & Edwin Valdez, G.R. No. 175602. January 18, 2012).

Chain of Custody

A review of the records establishes that the aforestated procedure laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR was not followed. Several lapses on the part of the buy-bust team are readily apparent. To start with, no photograph of the seized shabu was taken. Secondly, the buy-bust team did not immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the crime and in the presence of Relato and witnesses. Thirdly, although there was testimony about the marking of the seized items being made at the police station, the records do not show that the marking was done in the presence of Relato or his chosen representative. And, fourthly, no representative of the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected official attended the taking of the physical inventory and to sign the inventory.

While the last paragraph of Section 21(a) of the IRR provides a saving mechanism to ensure that not every case of non-compliance irreversibly prejudices the State’s evidence, it is significant to note that the application of the saving mechanism to a situation is expressly conditioned upon the State rendering an explanation of the lapse or lapses in the compliance with the procedures.¹³ Here, however, the Prosecution tendered no explanation why the buy-bust team had failed to mark the seized shabu immediately after the arrest. Nevertheless, even assuming that marking the shabu at the scene of the crime by the buy-bust team had not been practical or possible for the buy-bust team to do, the saving mechanism would still not be applicable due to the lack of a credible showing of any effort undertaken by the buy-bust team to keep the shabu intact while in transit to the police station (People of the Philippines Vs. Darwin Relato y Ajero, G.R. No. 173794. January 18, 2012).

Animus Possidendi

Upon the State’s presenting to the trial court of the facts and circumstances from which to infer the existence ofanimus possidendi, it becomes incumbent upon the Defense to rebut the inference with evidence that the accused did not exercise power and control of the illicit thing in question, and did not intend to do so. For that purpose, a mere unfounded assertion of the accused that he did not know that he had possession of the illegal drug is insufficient, and animus possidendi is then presumed to exist on his part because he was thereby shown to have performed an act that the law prohibited and punished.

It cannot be disputed that Delos Santos had animus possidendi. His conduct prior to and following his apprehension evinced his guilty knowledge of the contents of the gift-wrapped box as shabu. His uncorroborated story of having been summoned to help in the cleaning of Unit 706 was a sham excuse that he peddled to explain his presence in the Somerset Condominium. His explanation was useless, however, because he was no longer employed as a janitor of the Somerset Condominium at the time of his arrest after being already terminated from employment. Correlatively, his willingness to run for Wilson the errand of delivering the gift-wrapped box to the unnamed person near the Jollibee Vito Cruz extension branch proved that he was serving as a courier of shabu. Besides, his guilty knowledge was confirmed by his unreasonable refusal to exit from Unit 706 despite the demand of the NBI agents to do so, and by his stealthy transfer to the adjoining Unit 705. Had he been truly innocent, he would have voluntarily cooperated with the NBI agents instead of attempting to escape from them (People of the Philippines Vs. Geron Delos Santos y Maristela, G.R. No. 170839. January 18, 2012).

Self-Defense

Nonetheless, even if we were to believe Arnold and Joven’s version of the incident, the element of unlawful aggression by the victims would still be lacking. The allegation that one of the victims had held Winifreda’s hand did not indicate that the act had gravely endangered Winifreda’s life. Similarly, the victims’ supposed motion to draw something from their waists did not put Arnold and Joven’s lives in any actual or imminent danger. What the records inform us is that Arnold and Joven did not actually see if the victims had any weapons to draw from their waists. That no weapons belonging to the victims were recovered from the crime scene confirmed their being unarmed. Lastly, had they been only defending themselves, Arnold and Joven did not tell the trial court why they had repeatedly hacked their victims with their bolos; or why they did not themselves even sustain any physical injury (People of the Philippines Vs. Melanio Del Castillo y Vargas, et al., G.R. No. 169084. January 18, 2012).

Quitclaim

While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties. Considering the petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.

While the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into signing the release and waiver, his failure to present evidence renders his allegation self-serving and inutile to invalidate the same. That no portion of his retirement pay will be released to him or his urgent need for funds does not constitute the pressure or coercion contemplated by law.

That the petitioner was all set to return to his hometown and was in dire need of money would likewise not qualify as undue pressure sufficient to invalidate the quitclaim. "Dire necessity" may be an acceptable ground to annul quitclaims if the consideration is unconscionably low and the employee was tricked into accepting it, but is not an acceptable ground for annulling the release when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to execute it. While it is our duty to prevent the exploitation of employees, it also behooves us to protect the sanctity of contracts that do not contravene our laws.

The petitioner is not an ordinary laborer. He is mature, intelligent and educated with a college degree, who cannot be easily duped or tricked into performing an act against his will. As no proof was presented that the said quitclaim was entered into through fraud, deception, misrepresentation, the same is valid and binding. The petitioner is estopped from questioning the said quitclaim and cannot renege after accepting the benefits thereunder. This Court will never satisfy itself with surmises, conjectures or speculations for the purpose of giving imprimatur to the petitioner's attempt to abdicate from his obligations under a valid and binding release and waiver.

The petitioner's educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. This Court cannot permit the petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and understanding thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that the petitioner allowed to lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention (Hypte R. Aujero Vs. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation, G.R. No. 193484. January 18, 2012).

Effect of Novation to BP22

Anent the petitioner’s contention that novation had extinguished his criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22, we likewise find the same utterly specious. The petitioner ought to be reminded that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. As astutely opined by the CA, novation may only prevent the rise of criminal liability if it occurs prior to the filing of the Information in court. In other words, novation does not extinguish criminal liability but may only prevent its rise (Edgardo Medalla Vs. Resurreccion D. Laxa, G.R. No. 193362. January 18, 2012).

Issues Elevated on Appeal

In this respect, the NLRC cannot be accused of grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 4(c), Rule VI of the NLRC Rules, the NLRC shall limit itself to reviewing and deciding only the issues that were elevated on appeal. The NLRC, while not totally bound by technical rules of procedure, is not licensed to disregard and violate the implementing rules it implemented.

Nonetheless, technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Technical rules are not binding in labor cases and are not to be applied strictly if the result would be detrimental to the working man. This Court may choose not to encumber itself with technicalities and limitations consequent to procedural rules if such will only serve as a hindrance to its duty to decide cases judiciously and in a manner that would put an end with finality to all existing conflicts between the parties (Timoteo H. Sarona Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Roayle Security Agency, et al., G.R. No. 185280. January 18, 2012).

Appeal Despite Finality of Decision

The finality of the NLRC’s decision does not preclude the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. That the NLRC issues an entry of judgment after the lapse of ten (10) days from the parties’ receipt of its decision will only give rise to the prevailing party’s right to move for the execution thereof but will not prevent the CA from taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations (Timoteo H. Sarona Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Roayle Security Agency, et al., G.R. No. 185280. January 18, 2012).

Earnest Money

The P100,000.00 that was given to Msgr. Cirilos as “deposit” cannot be considered as earnest money. Where the parties merely exchanged offers and counter-offers, no contract is perfected since they did not yet give their consent to such offers. Earnest money applies to a perfected sale (Starbright Sales Eterprises, Inc. Vs. Philippine Realty Corporation, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, et al., G.R. No. 177936. January 18, 2012)