Probationary Teacher Contract

Section 91 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, states that:

Section 91. Employment Contract. Every contract of employment shall specify the designation, qualification, salary rate, the period and nature of service and its date of effectivity, and such other terms and condition of employment as may be consistent with laws and rules, regulations and standards of the school. A copy of the contract shall be furnished the personnel concerned.

It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify the period or term of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its precise duration could lead to the inference that the contract is binding for the full three-year probationary period. Therefore, the letters sent by petitioner Sr. Racadio, which were void of any specifics cannot be considered as contracts. The closest they can resemble to are that of informal correspondence among the said individuals. As such, petitioner school has the right not to renew the contracts of the respondents, the old ones having been expired at the end of their terms (St. Paul College Quezon City, et al. Vs. Remigio Michael A. Ancheta II and Cynthia A. Ancheta, G.R. No. 169905. September 7, 2011).

Grave Coercion vs. Unjust Vexation

In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by the CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.^[46] Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant because they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for which it was intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.

The case of Sy v. Secretary of Justice, cited by petitioners is not applicable in the present case. In Sy, the respondents therein, together with several men armed with hammers, ropes, axes, crowbars and other tools arrived at the complainants’ residence and ordered them to vacate the building because they were going to demolish it. Intimidated by respondents and their demolition team, complainants were prevented from peacefully occupying their residence and were compelled to leave against their will. Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the demolition while complainants watched helplessly as their building was torn down. The Court thus found that there was prima facie showing that complainants were intimidated and that there was probable cause for the crime of grave coercion.

On the contrary, the case of Barbasa v. Tuquero, applies. In Barbasa, the lessor, together with the head of security and several armed guards, disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied by the complainants-lessees because of the latter’s failure to pay the back rentals. The Court held that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce intimidation upon the lessees’ employees when the cutting off of electricity was effected. On the contrary, the Court found that it was done peacefully and that the guards were there not to intimidate them but to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of the lessor’s right under the contract. We reach the same conclusion in this case.

Notwithstanding the DOJ’s conclusion that respondents cannot be charged with grave coercion, it ordered the filing of information for unjust vexation against Amor, the Property Manager of DCCC and Aguilar as head of the security division. We find the same to be in order (Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro, Firdausi I.Y. Abbas, et al. Vs. Atty. Jose A. Bernas, et al., G.R. No. 179243. September 7, 2011)

Command Responsibility

In the present case, the CER’s reports of Hi-Flyer show that there were anomalies committed in the branches managed by Jumuad. On the principle ofrespondeat superior or command responsibility alone, Jumuad may be held liable for negligence in the performance of her managerial duties. She may not have been directly involved in causing the cash shortages in KFC-Bohol, but her involvement in not performing her duty monitoring and supporting the day to day operations of the branches and ensure that all the facilities and equipment at the restaurant were properly maintained and serviced, could have truly prevented the whole debacle from ever occurring.

Moreover, it is observed that rather than taking proactive steps to prevent the anomalies at her branches, Jumuad merely effected remedial measures. In the restaurant business where the health and well-being of the consuming public is at stake, this does not suffice. Thus, there is reasonable basis for Hi-Flyer to withdraw its trust in her and dismissing her from its service (Pamela Florentina P. Jumuad Vs. Hi-Flyer Food, Inc. and/or Jesus R. Montemayor,
G.R. No. 187887. September 7, 2011)

Sale of Co-Owner

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest) (Heirs of Protacio Go and Marta Barola, namely: Leonor Go, et al. Vs. Ester L. Servacio and Rito B. Go, G.R. No. 157537. September 7, 2011).

Remote Cause

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death (People of the Philippines Vs. Orlito Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412. September 7, 2011).

Annulment of Judgment

In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of respondents when, instead of simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the defendants (petitioners), it ordered the respondents-lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners-lessees, on the basis of its own interpretation of the Contract of Lease which granted petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within a certain period (two years from date of execution) and for a fixed price (P150,000.00). This cannot be done in an ejectment case where the only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to the physical possession of the property.

Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. The ground for annulment of the decision is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision, they failed to show that the RTC did not have the authority to decide the case on appeal (Spouses Eulogia Manila and Ramon Manila Vs. Spouses Ederlinda Gallardo-Manzo and Daniel Manzo, G.R. No. 163602. September 7, 2011).

Primary Entry Book

Jurisprudence has already established the rule that the entry of the notice of levy on execution in the Primary Entry Book, even without the corresponding annotation on the certificate of titles, is sufficient notice to all persons that the land is already subject to the levy (Spouses Anselmo and Priscilla Bulaong Vs. Veronica Gonzales, G.R. No. 156318. September 5, 2011)