Jurisdiction of IBP

The IBP cannot inquire into whether the complainant is an heir of the registered owner of the land. It is not within its authority to determine whether the complainant has a legal right to the properties involved in the transactions and to require her to submit proof to that effect. Its function is limited to disciplining lawyers, and it cannot determine issues of law and facts regarding the parties’ legal rights to a dispute (Rizalina L. Gemina Vs. Atty. Isidro S. Madamba, A.C. No. 6689. August 24, 2011).

Public Bidding

The grant of the right of first refusal in this case did not only substantially amend the terms of the contract bidded upon, so that resultantly, the other bidders thereto were deprived of the terms and opportunities granted to respondent after it won the public auction, it so altered the bid terms – the very admission by all parties that the disposal of fly ash must be through public bidding – by effectively barring any and all true biddings in the future. The grant of first refusal was a grant to respondent of the right to buy fly ash in all coal-fired plants of NPC. Proceeding from the afore-cited jurisprudence, the Batangas Contract is, consequently, a nullity.

As adverted to above, the disposal of NPC power plants’ fly ash is governed by COA Circular Nos. 86-264 and 89-296. These circulars direct that public auction shall be the primary mode of disposal of assets of the government and sale through negotiation shall be resorted to only in case of failure of public auction. For failure to abide by the requirement of a public bidding in the disposal of government assets, this Court is left with no option but to likewise declare the Sual and Masinloc Contracts null and void.

In conclusion, this Court stresses that although a right of first refusal is a contractual prerogative recognized by both law and jurisprudence, the grant of such right in this case is invalid for being contrary to public policy.

Grounds for Dispossession of Agricultural Tenant

The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to be considered as ground for dispossession of an agricultural tenant. While the “term ‘deliberate’ is characterized by or results from slow, careful, thorough calculation and consideration of effects and consequences,” the term "willful" has been “defined as one governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason.”

The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that Antonio’s dispossession is, however, still warranted by his repeated violations of the terms of the Leasehold Agreement which prohibited, among other matters, the cultivation of other plants on Manahan’s properties, the expansion of the tenant’s dwelling as well as the non-synchronized plantings and harvests thereon. Granted that paragraph III (G) of DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1993 allows the tenant to plant secondary crop on the land provided he shoulders the expenses thereof, Antonio’s planting of kangkong directly flies in the face of the categorical prohibition in the Leasehold Agreement against the planting of other plants on the land and Manahan’s objections/complaints against the same as early as 24 November 1994.^[41] Antonio’s claim that that kangkong grew naturally on the property is belied by the pictures submitted by Manahan and the PARAD’s finding that a 3,000 square meter portion of the property was devoted to said plant. To our mind, the legitimacy of Manahan’s complaint is borne out by the 7 October 1998 certification issued by the Bureau of Soils and Water Management (BSWM) that kangkong deprives rice plants of essential plant foods, overcrowds them and generally reduces the yield.

In addition, it was likewise established that Antonio planted other vegetable crops like string beans, tomatoes, squash and eggplant, built three pigpens and another residential structure on the land and resorted to rice planting in three phases, in violation of the express prohibitions in the Leasehold Agreement (Rene Antonio Vs. Gregorio Manahan, G.R. No. 176091. August 24, 2011).

Payment of Insurance Claim

Section 241 of the Insurance Code provides that no insurance company doing business in the Philippines shall refuse without just cause to pay or settle claims arising under coverages provided by its policies. And, under Section 243, the insurer has 30 days after proof of loss is received and ascertainment of the loss or damage within which to pay the claim. If such ascertainment is not had within 60 days from receipt of evidence of loss, the insurer has 90 days to pay or settle the claim. And, in case the insurer refuses or fails to pay within the prescribed time, the insured shall be entitled to interest on the proceeds of the policy for the duration of delay at the rate of twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board (New World International Development (Phils.), Inc. Vs. Nyk-FilJapan Shipping Corp., et al./New World International Development(Phils.), Inc. Vs. Seaboard-Eastern Insurance Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 171468/G.R. No. 174241. August 24, 2011).

Summary Judgment

A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue. Summary judgment is proper in such a case (Pilipino Telephone Corporation Vs. Radiomarine Network (Smartnet) Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 160322. August 24, 2011).

Conspiracy

Conspiracy was also duly established as Ricky Ramos testified that while Cleofe pulled Nelson, Leonardo fired shots at Nelson. Conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the two accused, their common purpose, being, to kill Nelson (People of the Philippines Vs. Cleofe Baroquillo y Villanueva, et al. accused; and Cleofe Baroquillo y Villanueva, and Leonardo Mahilum y Cañete, accused-appellants,
G.R. No. 184960. August 24, 2011).

Inverse Condemnation Proceedings

The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided in its decision. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC’s entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC’s entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted (National Power Corporation Vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011).