Presence of Counsel in Promulgation

There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on both accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced (Marino B. Icdan Vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 185960. January 25, 2012).

Quasi-Delict

Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that night, Antonio should have been prudent to reduce his speed and increase his distance from the Pathfinder. Had he done so, it would be improbable for him to have hit the vehicle in front of him or if he really could not avoid hitting it, prevent such extensive wreck to the vehicle in front. With the glaring evidence, he obviously failed to exercise proper care in his driving.

Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused (Crix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (Formerly Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance) Vs. Minors: Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and Marikris, All surnamed Mangalinao y Dizon, et al. Sonny Li and Antonio Delos Santos Vs. Minors: Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and Marikris, All Surnamed Mangalinao Y Dizon, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 174089. January 25, 2012).

Refused to Receive

In Bughaw v. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation, this Court, in verifying the veracity of the allegation that respondent refused to receive the Notice of Termination, essentially looked for the following: (1) affidavit of service stating the reason for failure to serve the notice upon the recipient; and (2) a notation to that effect, which shall be written on the notice itself (Mansion Printing Center and Clement Cheng Vs. Diosdado Bitara, Jr., G.R. No. 168120. January 25, 2012).

Valid Dismissal - Conviction

The petitioner’s argument is not novel. It has been raised and rejected many times before on the basis that neither conviction beyond reasonable doubt for a crime against the employer nor acquittal after criminal prosecution was indispensable. Nor was a formal charge in court for the acts prejudicial to the interest of the employer a pre-requisite for a valid dismissal (Lolita S. Concepcion Vs. Minex Import Corporation/Minerama Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 153569. January 24, 2012).

Supervisory Power of RTC - Quashal of Writ of Execution

Neither can We affirm petitioner's contention that in seeking the quashal of the writ of possession, the respondents were, in effect, asking the RTC to abrogate its decision, which had already attained finality. As correctly observed by the CA, the quashal of a writ of possession does not have the effect of modifying or abrogating the judgment of the RTC. “The settled rule is that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and hence may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes – all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest.” To reiterate, however, the court's power with regard to execution of judgments extends only to properties irrefutably belonging to the judgment debtor, which does not obtain in this case.

Therefore, petitioner's contention that the writ of possession had already been enforced and can no longer be quashed deserves scant consideration. Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory control over the entire execution process, and such authority carries with it the right to determine every question which may be invariably involved in the execution. Respondents invoked this supervisory power when they sought the quashal of the writ of possession (Vashdeo Gagoomal Vs. Spouses Ramon and Natividad Villacorta, G.R. No. 192813. January 18, 2012).

Lis Pendens

The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a dual effect: (1) to keep the property subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or otherwise, of the property subject of the litigation to the judgment that the court will subsequently promulgate.

Thus, a notice of lis pendens is only valid and effective when it affects title over or right of possession of a real property.

In this case, it cannot be denied that Civil Case No. 67381, which RAM, predecessor-in-interest of petitioner, instituted against Zeñarosa was for collection of sum of money with damages – a purely personal action. Hence, the notice of lis pendens in favor of RAM annotated on the cancelled TCT No. 170213 and carried over to Tan's TCT No. 10206 conferred upon it no rights over the subject property and, as a necessary consequence, upon petitioner, its successor-in-interest (Vashdeo Gagoomal Vs. Spouses Ramon and Natividad Villacorta, G.R. No. 192813. January 18, 2012).

Sufficiency of Allegation in Information

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their bodies “which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations (People of the Philippines Vs. PO2 Eduardo Valdez & Edwin Valdez, G.R. No. 175602. January 18, 2012).