Filing Fee

The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. The “prescriptive period” that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in which a specific action must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period, as provided in the applicable laws, particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of actions (Fedman Development Corporation Vs. Federico Agcaoili, G.R. No. 165025. August 31, 2011).

Criminal Case v. Administrative Cae

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act (Jose R. Catacutan Vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175991. August 31, 2011).

Illegal Arrest

At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused (Abraham Miclat, Jr. y Cerbo Vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176077. August 31, 2011).

Chain of Custody

In the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, the following links must be established: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court (People of the Philippines Vs. Juan Mendoza y Vicente, G.R. No. 186387. August 31, 2011).

Coordination with PDEA

In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 [citation omitted] of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA’s participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an inflagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 [citation omitted] of the Rules of Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA [citation omitted]. A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA (People of the Philippines Vs. Ricky Unisa y Islan, G.R. No. 185721. September 28, 2011).

Utra Violet Powder

Equally, the only purpose for treating with ultra-violet powder the buy-bust money to be used in the actual buy-bust operation is for identification, that is, to determine if there was receipt of the buy-bust money by the accused in exchange for the illegal drugs he was selling. In the present case, although the buy-bust money were not laced with ultra-violet powder, still, the prosecution was able to positively identify that the two P100.00-peso bills recovered from appellant right after his arrest were the buy-bust money as the same were photocopied and entered in the police blotter before the actual buy-bust operation (People of the Philippines Vs. Ricky Unisa y Islan, G.R. No. 185721. September 28, 2011).

Disposition of Seized Properties

We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act (Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Vs. Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph, G.R. No. 196390. September 28, 2011).

Levy of Conjugal Property

Sheriff Pascua’s assertions of diligence do not exculpate him from administrative liability. After inquiry from the LTO, he already discovered that the vehicle was registered in Yolanda’s name only. This fact should have already prompted Sheriff Pascua to gather more information, such as when Juanito and Yolanda were married and when did Yolanda acquire the vehicle, which, in turn, would have determined whether or not Sheriff Pascua could already presume that the said vehicle is conjugal property.

In this case, Sheriff Pascua totally ignored the established procedural rules. Without giving Juanito the opportunity to either pay his obligation under the MTCC judgment in cash, certified bank check, or any other mode of payment acceptable to Panganiban; or to choose which of his property may be levied upon to satisfy the same judgment, Sheriff Pascua immediately levied upon the vehicle that belonged to Juanito’s wife, Yolanda.

Sheriff Pascua’s explanation for parking Yolanda’s vehicle at his home garage is just as unacceptable. Granted that it was unsafe to park the vehicle within the court premises, Sheriff Pascua should have kept the said vehicle in a bonded warehouse or sought prior authorization from the MTCC to park the same at another place (Yolanda Leachon Corpuz Vs. Sergio V. Pascua, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires City, Cavite, A.M. No. P-11-2972. September 28, 2011).

Contempt

Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still not a valid defense in cases of contempt. “Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.” (Ferdinand A. Cruz Vs. Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon (deceased), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 117, Pasay City, G.R. No. 170404. September 28, 2011).

Res Judicata

In her Complaint in Civil Case No. 276, respondent already alleged her right to redemption and prayed, among others, the RTC-Branch 55 to order respondent legally entitled to redeem the subject property for the price of P52,000.00. The Decision dated May 8, 1996 of the RTC-Branch 55 neither discussed respondent’s right to redemption nor ordered in its decretal portion for petitioners to accept respondent’s offer to redeem the subject property. In consonance with the provisions of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court cited above, we hold that all the matters within the issues raised in Civil Case No. 276 were laid before RTC-Branch 55 and passed upon by it. Resultantly, the silence of the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case No. 276 on respondent’s right to redemption invoked by the latter does not mean that RTC-Branch 55 did not take cognizance of the same, but rather, that RTC-Branch 55 did not deem respondent entitled to said right.

We stress that res judicata, in the concept of bar by prior judgment, renders the judgment or final order conclusive between the parties and their privies, not just with respect to a matter directly adjudged, but also any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto

(Tobias Selga, et al. Vs. Sony Entierro Brar, represented by her Attorney-in-fact Marina T. Entierro, G.R. No. 175151. September 21, 2011).

Cause of Action vs. Relief

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as “the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.” The cause of action in Civil Case No. 273 and Civil Case No. 576 is the sale of the entire subject property by Basilia, et al., to petitioners without respondent’s knowledge and consent, hence, depriving respondent of her rights and interests over her pro-indiviso share in the subject property as a co-heir and co-owner. The annulment of the sale of respondent’s share in the subject property, the legal redemption by respondent of her co-heirs’ share sold to petitioners, and the claim for damages should not be mistaken to be the causes of action, but they were the remedies and reliefs prayed for by the respondent to redress the wrong allegedly committed against her (Tobias Selga, et al. Vs. Sony Entierro Brar, represented by her Attorney-in-fact Marina T. Entierro, G.R. No. 175151. September 21, 2011).

Constructive Dismissal

Simply put, security of tenure from which springs the concept of constructive dismissal is not an absolute right. It cannot be pleaded to avoid the transfer or assignment of employees according to the requirements of the employer’s business. Such transfer or assignment becomes objectionable only when it is not for “reasonable returns on investments,” and for “expansion and growth” which are constitutionally recognized employer’s rights, but is sought merely as a convenient cover for oppression (United Laboratories, Inc. Vs. Jaime Domingo Substituted by his spouse Carmencita Punzalan Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 186209. September 21, 2011).

Rights of Assignee of Partner

From the foregoing provision, it is evident that “(t)he transfer by a partner of his partnership interest does not make the assignee of such interest a partner of the firm, nor entitle the assignee to interfere in the management of the partnership business or to receive anything except the assignee’s profits. The assignment does not purport to transfer an interest in the partnership, but only a future contingent right to a portion of the ultimate residue as the assignor may become entitled to receive by virtue of his proportionate interest in the capital.” Since a partner’s interest in the partnership includes his share in the profits, we find that the CA committed no reversible error in ruling that the Spouses Jaso are entitled to Biondo’s share in the profits, despite Juanita’s lack of consent to the assignment of said Frenchman’s interest in the joint venture. Although Eden did not, moreover, become a partner as a consequence of the assignment and/or acquire the right to require an accounting of the partnership business, the CA correctly granted her prayer for dissolution of the joint venture conformably with the right granted to the purchaser of a partner’s interest under Article 1831 of the Civil Code (Josefina P. Realubit Vs. Prosencio D. Jaso and Eden G. Jaso, G.R. No. 178782. September 21, 2011).

Freezing of Account

We also find that PCIB acted illegally in freezing and debiting Ramos’ bank account. In BPI Family Bank v. Franco, we cautioned against the unilateral freezing of bank accounts by banks, noting that:

More importantly, [BPI Family Bank] does not have a unilateral right to freeze the accounts of Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds therein were proceeds of the multi-million peso scam Franco was allegedly involved in. To grant [BPI Family Bank], or any bank for that matter, the right to take whatever action it pleases on deposits which it supposes are derived from shady transactions, would open the floodgates of public distrust in the banking industry.

We see no legal merit in PCIB’s claim that legal compensation took place between it and Ramos, thereby warranting the automatic deduction from Ramos’ bank account. For legal compensation to take place, two persons, in their own right, must first be creditors and debtors of each other. While PCIB, as the depositary bank, is Ramos’ debtor in the amount of his deposits, Ramos is not PCIB’s debtor under the evidence the PCIB adduced. PCIB thus had no basis, in fact or in law, to automatically debit from Ramos’ bank account (Philippine Commercial Bank Vs. Antonio B. Balmaceda and Rolando N. Ramos, G.R. No. 158143. September 21, 2011).

Simulated Contract

Article 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because they refer to contracts with an illegal cause or subject-matter. This article presupposes the existence of a cause, it cannot refer to fictitious or simulated contracts which are in reality non-existent. As it has been determined that the Deed of Sale is a simulated contract, the provision cannot apply to it.

Granting that the Deed of Sale was not simulated, the provision would still not apply. Since the subject properties were included as properties of Alfonso in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, they are covered by corresponding inheritance and estate taxes. Therefore, tax evasion, if at all present, would not arise, and Article 1412 would again be inapplicable (Hiers of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al./Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al., G.R. No. 165748/G.R. No. 165930. September 14, 2011).

Extrajudicial Partition

Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrado’s co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority (Hiers of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al./Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al., G.R. No. 165748/G.R. No. 165930. September 14, 2011).

Serious Misconduct

The Letter-Explanation partly reads:

Again, it's not negligence on my part and I'm not alone to be blamed. It's negligence on your part [Perla Go] and A.A. Del Rosario kasi, noong pang April 1999 ay alam ninyo na hindi ako ang dapat may responsibilidad ng payroll kundi ang Section Head eh bakit hindi ninyo pinahawak sa Section Head noon pa. Pati kaming dalawa sa payroll, kasama ko si Thelma. Tinanggal nyo si Thelma. Hindi nyo ba naisip na kailangan dalawa ang tao sa payroll para pag absent ang isa ay may gagawa. Dapat noon nyo pa naisip iyan. Ang tagal kong gumawa ng trabahong hindi ko naman dapat ginagawa.

This Court finds the above to be grossly discourteous in content and tenor. The most appropriate thing he could have done was simply to state his facts without resorting to such strong language. Past decisions of this Court have been one in ruling that accusatory and inflammatory language used by an employee to the employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or termination (Nissan Motors Phils., Inc. Vs. Victorino Angelo, G.R. No. 164181. September 14, 2011).

Judgment on the merits

As the dismissal of G.R. No. 74302 was without prejudice, it was not a judgment on the merits. A judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point. The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not been commenced. In other words, the discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action on the same subject matter (Presidential Commission on Good Government Vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), et al., G.R. No. 152500. September 14, 2011).

Judgment on the merits

As the dismissal of G.R. No. 74302 was without prejudice, it was not a judgment on the merits. A judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point. The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not been commenced. In other words, the discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action on the same subject matter (Presidential Commission on Good Government Vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), et al., G.R. No. 152500. September 14, 2011).

Constructive Service of Mail

The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service the completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2) constructive service the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of five days from the date the addressee received the first notice of the postmaster.

Insofar as constructive service is concerned, there must be conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. Not only is it required that notice of the registered mail be issued but that it should also be delivered to and received by the addressee. Notably, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is not applicable in this situation. It is incumbent upon a party who relies on constructive service to prove that the notice was sent to, and received by, the addressee.

The best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the postmaster, who should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery and receipt was made. The mailman may also testify that the notice was actually delivered (Jose Mel Bernante Vs. Philippine Basketball Association, et al., G.R. No. 192084. September 14, 2011).

Loss of Earning Capacity

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the accused are also jointly and severally liable for the loss of the earning capacity of Biag and such indemnity should be paid to his heirs (People of the Philippines Vs. Renato Lagat y Gawan, a.k.a. Renat Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa, G.R. No. 187044. September 14, 2011).

Summons

In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Domingo specifically named as defendant the DPWH Region III. As correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its regional office are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Thus, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been served on the OSG (Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways, throug the Hon. Secretary Hermogenes Ebdane Vs. Alberto Domingo, G.R. No. 175299. September 14, 2011).

Abandonment

Petitioners aver that respondents were merely transferred to a new post wherein the wages are adjusted to the current minimum wage standards. They maintain that the respondents voluntarily abandoned their jobs when they failed to report for duty in the new location.

Assuming this is true, we still cannot hold that the respondents abandoned their posts. For abandonment of work to fall under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, as gross and habitual neglect of duties there must be the concurrence of two elements. First, there should be a failure of the employee to report for work without a valid or justifiable reason, and second, there should be a showing that the employee intended to sever the employer-employee relationship, the second element being the more determinative factor as manifested by overt acts.

As regards the second element of intent to sever the employer-employee relationship, the CA correctly ruled that:

x x x the fact that petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal is indicative of their intention to remain employed with private respondent considering that one of their prayers in the complaint is for re-instatement. As declared by the Supreme Court, a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, because when an employee takes steps to protect himself against a dismissal, this cannot, by logic, be said to be abandonment by him of his right to be able to work.

Further, according to Alert Security itself, respondents continued to report for work and loiter in the DOST after the alleged transfer order was issued. Such circumstance makes it unlikely that respondents have clear intention of leaving their respective jobs. In any case, there is no dispute that in cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker’s last known address. This petitioners failed to do (Alert Security and Investigation Agency, Inc., et al. Vs. Saidali Pasawilan, et al., G.R. No. 182397. September 14, 2011).

.

Failure to Prosecute

A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only delays that may be excluded from the time limit within which trial must commence are those resulting from proceedings concerning the accused. The time involved in the proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be excluded from said time limit if it was the accused who instituted the same. Hence, in this case, the time during which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant is pending, cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had, in fact, already been breached. The private prosecutor received the Pre-trial Order dated November 24, 2008 on December 3, 2008, while the Provincial Prosecutor received the same on December 2, 2008. This means that at the latest, trial should have commenced by January 2, 2009, or if said date was a Sunday or holiday, then on the very next business day. Yet, because of the prosecution's failure to appear at the December 12, 2008 hearing for the initial presentation of the prosecution's evidence, the RTC was constrained to reset the hearing to January 16, 2009, which is already beyond the 30-day time limit. Nevertheless, the prosecution again failed to appear at the January 16, 2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior by obstinately refusing to comply with the RTC's directives to commence presentation of their evidence. Petitioners did not even show proper courtesy to the court, by filing motions for cancellation of the hearings on the very day of the hearing and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing on their motion. As set forth in the narration of facts above, the prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying and trifling with court processes (Churchille V. Mari and People of the Philippines Vs. Hon. Rolando L. Gonzales, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 39, Sogo, Southern Leyte and PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres, G.R. No. 187728. September 12, 2011).

Bond Agreement

As for the land titles surrendered by respondents, the Court determines that Swift has no basis for retaining the same as “collateral for feeds warehousing.” While the warehousing agreement stipulated that the respondents shall post a bond (which may be in the form of a property bond), this was merely a future undertaking that did not actually materialize. Although the respondents delivered their land titles to Swift, they did not actually execute any bond agreement or security instrument (such as real estate mortgage). In the absence of such bond agreement or security instrument, it cannot be said that a bond has actually been posted or constituted. Besides, even assuming arguendo that the real properties served as collateral, petitioner cannot just appropriate them in view of the prohibition against pactum commissorium (Swift Foods, Inc. Vs. Spouses Jose Mateo, Jr. and Irene Mateo, G.R. No. 170486. September 12, 2011).

Probationary Teacher Contract

Section 91 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, states that:

Section 91. Employment Contract. Every contract of employment shall specify the designation, qualification, salary rate, the period and nature of service and its date of effectivity, and such other terms and condition of employment as may be consistent with laws and rules, regulations and standards of the school. A copy of the contract shall be furnished the personnel concerned.

It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify the period or term of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its precise duration could lead to the inference that the contract is binding for the full three-year probationary period. Therefore, the letters sent by petitioner Sr. Racadio, which were void of any specifics cannot be considered as contracts. The closest they can resemble to are that of informal correspondence among the said individuals. As such, petitioner school has the right not to renew the contracts of the respondents, the old ones having been expired at the end of their terms (St. Paul College Quezon City, et al. Vs. Remigio Michael A. Ancheta II and Cynthia A. Ancheta, G.R. No. 169905. September 7, 2011).

Grave Coercion vs. Unjust Vexation

In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by the CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.^[46] Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant because they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for which it was intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.

The case of Sy v. Secretary of Justice, cited by petitioners is not applicable in the present case. In Sy, the respondents therein, together with several men armed with hammers, ropes, axes, crowbars and other tools arrived at the complainants’ residence and ordered them to vacate the building because they were going to demolish it. Intimidated by respondents and their demolition team, complainants were prevented from peacefully occupying their residence and were compelled to leave against their will. Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the demolition while complainants watched helplessly as their building was torn down. The Court thus found that there was prima facie showing that complainants were intimidated and that there was probable cause for the crime of grave coercion.

On the contrary, the case of Barbasa v. Tuquero, applies. In Barbasa, the lessor, together with the head of security and several armed guards, disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied by the complainants-lessees because of the latter’s failure to pay the back rentals. The Court held that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce intimidation upon the lessees’ employees when the cutting off of electricity was effected. On the contrary, the Court found that it was done peacefully and that the guards were there not to intimidate them but to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of the lessor’s right under the contract. We reach the same conclusion in this case.

Notwithstanding the DOJ’s conclusion that respondents cannot be charged with grave coercion, it ordered the filing of information for unjust vexation against Amor, the Property Manager of DCCC and Aguilar as head of the security division. We find the same to be in order (Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro, Firdausi I.Y. Abbas, et al. Vs. Atty. Jose A. Bernas, et al., G.R. No. 179243. September 7, 2011)

Command Responsibility

In the present case, the CER’s reports of Hi-Flyer show that there were anomalies committed in the branches managed by Jumuad. On the principle ofrespondeat superior or command responsibility alone, Jumuad may be held liable for negligence in the performance of her managerial duties. She may not have been directly involved in causing the cash shortages in KFC-Bohol, but her involvement in not performing her duty monitoring and supporting the day to day operations of the branches and ensure that all the facilities and equipment at the restaurant were properly maintained and serviced, could have truly prevented the whole debacle from ever occurring.

Moreover, it is observed that rather than taking proactive steps to prevent the anomalies at her branches, Jumuad merely effected remedial measures. In the restaurant business where the health and well-being of the consuming public is at stake, this does not suffice. Thus, there is reasonable basis for Hi-Flyer to withdraw its trust in her and dismissing her from its service (Pamela Florentina P. Jumuad Vs. Hi-Flyer Food, Inc. and/or Jesus R. Montemayor,
G.R. No. 187887. September 7, 2011)

Sale of Co-Owner

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest) (Heirs of Protacio Go and Marta Barola, namely: Leonor Go, et al. Vs. Ester L. Servacio and Rito B. Go, G.R. No. 157537. September 7, 2011).

Remote Cause

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death (People of the Philippines Vs. Orlito Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412. September 7, 2011).

Annulment of Judgment

In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of respondents when, instead of simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the defendants (petitioners), it ordered the respondents-lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners-lessees, on the basis of its own interpretation of the Contract of Lease which granted petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within a certain period (two years from date of execution) and for a fixed price (P150,000.00). This cannot be done in an ejectment case where the only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to the physical possession of the property.

Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. The ground for annulment of the decision is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision, they failed to show that the RTC did not have the authority to decide the case on appeal (Spouses Eulogia Manila and Ramon Manila Vs. Spouses Ederlinda Gallardo-Manzo and Daniel Manzo, G.R. No. 163602. September 7, 2011).

Primary Entry Book

Jurisprudence has already established the rule that the entry of the notice of levy on execution in the Primary Entry Book, even without the corresponding annotation on the certificate of titles, is sufficient notice to all persons that the land is already subject to the levy (Spouses Anselmo and Priscilla Bulaong Vs. Veronica Gonzales, G.R. No. 156318. September 5, 2011)

Drugs

However, SPO1 Mora’s testimony is unreliable. First, he testified that after interviewing the confidential informant who arrived at their office either at 5 p.m. or 5:30 p.m. of 6 November 2006, they prepared the Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet and sent it to PDEA on the same day. However, the time stamped on the Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet showed that it was sent to PDEA much earlier - either at 1:30 p.m., 1:40 p.m. or 2 p.m. of 6 November 2006. Second, while SPO1 Mora claimed to have custody of the shabu specimen right after recovering it from Martin during the latter’s arrest, he did not mark the same at the scene of the crime. This is contrary to the explicit procedure for seizure of evidence laid down in Section 21 of R.A. 9165. He justified his non-compliance by saying that at the time, the guidelines had not yet been “properly implemented.” Contrary to SPO1 Mora’s excuse, however, the implementing guidelines for R.A. No. 9165 took effect on November 27, 2002, or four years before this incident. Third, SPO1 Mora had custody of the buy-bust money at the time of Martin’s arrest but when asked to explain its loss less than a year after the incident, he could not remember whether or not he handed it over to the investigator.

In view of the cited irregularities in the buy bust operation and the processing of the evidence shown in the preceding discussion, SPO1 Mora’s word cannot be given more weight than that of the accused (People of the Philippines Vs. Roberto Martin y Castano, G.R. No. 193234. October 19, 2011).

Price Escalation

PD 454 which was enacted prior to PD 1594, was where the phrase “direct acts of the government” was explained to cover the increase of prices during the effectivity of a government infrastructure contract. The phrase was first used in Republic Act (RA) No. 1595, which was amended by PD 454. The latter amended R.A. No. 1595 by supplying the meaning of the phrase “direct acts of the government” and expressly including the increase of prices of gasoline within the coverage of that phrase. Consequently, when PD 1594 reproduced the phrase without supplying a contrary or different definition, the definition provided by the earlier enacted PD 454 was deemed adopted by the later decree. Thus, proof of an increase in fuel and cement price and a subsequent increase in the cost of labor and relevant construction materials during the contract period are considered a compliance with the IRR requirements for a claim for price escalation (Philippine Economic zone Authority Vs. Green Asia Construction & Development Corporation, etc., G.R. No. 188866. October 19, 2011).

Attorney's Fees

As regards the award of attorney’s fees, the Court upholds De Guzman’s entitlement to reasonable attorney’s fees, although it recognizes that it is a sound policy not to set a premium on the right to litigate. It must be recalled that De Guzman’s repeated demands for the repair of the fence or the payment of damages by way of compensation, were not heeded by the Contractor. The latter’s unjust refusal to satisfy De Guzman’s valid, just and demandable claim constrained her to litigate and incur expenses to protect her interest (Emerita M. De Guzman Vs. Antonio M. Tumolva, G.R. No. 188072. October 19, 2011).

Non-Compliance to Directive

In fact, it can be said that Benedictos’s non-compliance with the OCA directives is tantamount to insubordination to the Court itself (Falsification of Daily Time Records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, A.M. No. P-10-2784. October 19, 2011).

Malversation by Negligence

Notably, the JAO is used to summarize obligations incurred and to monitor the balance of unobligated allotments, which is prepared by function, and project for each fund and allotment class. The JAO is thus separate and distinct from the Report of Checks Issued (RCI) which is prepared by the Disbursing Officer to report checks issued for payment of expenditures and/or prior accounts payable. What is clear is that the disbursement of funds covered by the 52 checks issued by the petitioners are subject to the rule that disbursement voucher “shall be used by all government entities for all money claims” and that the “voucher number shall be indicated on the voucher and on every supporting document.” Inasmuch as the JAO for the months of January, February and March 1993 do not at all reflect or indicate the number of each of the disbursement vouchers supposedly attached to the 52 checks, it cannot serve as evidence of the recording of the original vouchers, much less the existence of those disbursement vouchers at the time of the issuance of the 52 checks and the conduct of the expanded audit.

As the Regional Governor of ARMM, petitioner Zacaria A. Candao cannot exonerate himself from liability for the illegally withdrawn funds of ORG-ARMM. Under Section 102 (1) of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, he is responsible for all government funds pertaining to the agency he heads:

Section 102. Primary and secondary responsibility. – (1) The head of any agency of the government is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to his agency.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and his Executive Secretary Abas A. Candao are both accountable public officers within the meaning of Article 217 of theRevised Penal Code, as amended. No checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, any disbursement and release of public funds require their approval, as in fact checks issued and signed by petitioner Haron had to be countersigned by them. Their indispensable participation in the issuance of the subject checks to effect illegal withdrawals of ARMM funds was therefore duly established by the prosecution and the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron in embezzling and misappropriating such funds.

Moreover, as such accountable officers, petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao were charged with the duty of diligently supervising their subordinates to prevent loss of government funds or property, and are thus liable for any unlawful application of government funds resulting from negligence, as provided in Sections 104 and 105 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.

And even if petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao invoke lack of knowledge in the criminal design of their subordinate, Disbursing Officer Haron, they are still liable as co-principals in the crime of malversation assuming such misappropriation of public funds was not intentional, as alleged in the informations, but due to their negligence in the performance of their duties. As this Court ratiocinated in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan:

Besides, even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpapresent in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. A possible exception would be when the mode of commission alleged in the particulars of the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that it may be said due process was denied by deluding the accused into an erroneous comprehension of the charge against him. That no such prejudice was occasioned on petitioner nor was he beleaguered in his defense is apparent from the records of this case (Candao v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 186659-710. October 19, 2011).