Filing Fee

The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. The “prescriptive period” that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in which a specific action must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period, as provided in the applicable laws, particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of actions (Fedman Development Corporation Vs. Federico Agcaoili, G.R. No. 165025. August 31, 2011).

Criminal Case v. Administrative Cae

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act (Jose R. Catacutan Vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175991. August 31, 2011).

Illegal Arrest

At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused (Abraham Miclat, Jr. y Cerbo Vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176077. August 31, 2011).

Chain of Custody

In the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, the following links must be established: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court (People of the Philippines Vs. Juan Mendoza y Vicente, G.R. No. 186387. August 31, 2011).

Coordination with PDEA

In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 [citation omitted] of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA’s participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an inflagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 [citation omitted] of the Rules of Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA [citation omitted]. A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA (People of the Philippines Vs. Ricky Unisa y Islan, G.R. No. 185721. September 28, 2011).

Utra Violet Powder

Equally, the only purpose for treating with ultra-violet powder the buy-bust money to be used in the actual buy-bust operation is for identification, that is, to determine if there was receipt of the buy-bust money by the accused in exchange for the illegal drugs he was selling. In the present case, although the buy-bust money were not laced with ultra-violet powder, still, the prosecution was able to positively identify that the two P100.00-peso bills recovered from appellant right after his arrest were the buy-bust money as the same were photocopied and entered in the police blotter before the actual buy-bust operation (People of the Philippines Vs. Ricky Unisa y Islan, G.R. No. 185721. September 28, 2011).

Disposition of Seized Properties

We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act (Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Vs. Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph, G.R. No. 196390. September 28, 2011).

Levy of Conjugal Property

Sheriff Pascua’s assertions of diligence do not exculpate him from administrative liability. After inquiry from the LTO, he already discovered that the vehicle was registered in Yolanda’s name only. This fact should have already prompted Sheriff Pascua to gather more information, such as when Juanito and Yolanda were married and when did Yolanda acquire the vehicle, which, in turn, would have determined whether or not Sheriff Pascua could already presume that the said vehicle is conjugal property.

In this case, Sheriff Pascua totally ignored the established procedural rules. Without giving Juanito the opportunity to either pay his obligation under the MTCC judgment in cash, certified bank check, or any other mode of payment acceptable to Panganiban; or to choose which of his property may be levied upon to satisfy the same judgment, Sheriff Pascua immediately levied upon the vehicle that belonged to Juanito’s wife, Yolanda.

Sheriff Pascua’s explanation for parking Yolanda’s vehicle at his home garage is just as unacceptable. Granted that it was unsafe to park the vehicle within the court premises, Sheriff Pascua should have kept the said vehicle in a bonded warehouse or sought prior authorization from the MTCC to park the same at another place (Yolanda Leachon Corpuz Vs. Sergio V. Pascua, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires City, Cavite, A.M. No. P-11-2972. September 28, 2011).

Contempt

Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still not a valid defense in cases of contempt. “Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.” (Ferdinand A. Cruz Vs. Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon (deceased), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 117, Pasay City, G.R. No. 170404. September 28, 2011).

Res Judicata

In her Complaint in Civil Case No. 276, respondent already alleged her right to redemption and prayed, among others, the RTC-Branch 55 to order respondent legally entitled to redeem the subject property for the price of P52,000.00. The Decision dated May 8, 1996 of the RTC-Branch 55 neither discussed respondent’s right to redemption nor ordered in its decretal portion for petitioners to accept respondent’s offer to redeem the subject property. In consonance with the provisions of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court cited above, we hold that all the matters within the issues raised in Civil Case No. 276 were laid before RTC-Branch 55 and passed upon by it. Resultantly, the silence of the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case No. 276 on respondent’s right to redemption invoked by the latter does not mean that RTC-Branch 55 did not take cognizance of the same, but rather, that RTC-Branch 55 did not deem respondent entitled to said right.

We stress that res judicata, in the concept of bar by prior judgment, renders the judgment or final order conclusive between the parties and their privies, not just with respect to a matter directly adjudged, but also any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto

(Tobias Selga, et al. Vs. Sony Entierro Brar, represented by her Attorney-in-fact Marina T. Entierro, G.R. No. 175151. September 21, 2011).

Cause of Action vs. Relief

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as “the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.” The cause of action in Civil Case No. 273 and Civil Case No. 576 is the sale of the entire subject property by Basilia, et al., to petitioners without respondent’s knowledge and consent, hence, depriving respondent of her rights and interests over her pro-indiviso share in the subject property as a co-heir and co-owner. The annulment of the sale of respondent’s share in the subject property, the legal redemption by respondent of her co-heirs’ share sold to petitioners, and the claim for damages should not be mistaken to be the causes of action, but they were the remedies and reliefs prayed for by the respondent to redress the wrong allegedly committed against her (Tobias Selga, et al. Vs. Sony Entierro Brar, represented by her Attorney-in-fact Marina T. Entierro, G.R. No. 175151. September 21, 2011).

Constructive Dismissal

Simply put, security of tenure from which springs the concept of constructive dismissal is not an absolute right. It cannot be pleaded to avoid the transfer or assignment of employees according to the requirements of the employer’s business. Such transfer or assignment becomes objectionable only when it is not for “reasonable returns on investments,” and for “expansion and growth” which are constitutionally recognized employer’s rights, but is sought merely as a convenient cover for oppression (United Laboratories, Inc. Vs. Jaime Domingo Substituted by his spouse Carmencita Punzalan Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 186209. September 21, 2011).