Preliminary Mandatory Injunction

Based on the foregoing disquisition, we find that the RTC had sufficient bases to issue the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as all the requisites for the issuance of such writ were established.  We agree with the RTC that respondent has a right to recover the five titles because petitioner failed to comply with his obligation to respondent.  It bears stressing that respondent was compelled to directly pay CMC to avoid the foreclosure of the  chattel mortgages, which respondent executed in favor of CMC.   Considering that respondent has paid most, if not all, of its obligations to CMC, there is no reason for petitioner to hold on to the titles (Goerge S. H. Sy, etc. Vs. Autobus Transport System, Inc., G.R. No. 176898. December 3, 2012).

Real Party in Interest - Forcible Entry

Notably, even public lands can be the subject of forcible entry cases as it has already been held that ejectment proceedings may involve all kinds of land. Thus, in the case at bench, while the parties are fighting over the possession of a government land, the courts below are not deprived of jurisdiction to render judgment thereon. Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suit are mere informal settlers.

Sans the presence of the awardee of the Certificate of Stewardship, the provision clearly allows Valeriana to institute the action for the recovery of the physical possession of the property against the alleged usurper.  She has a right or interest to protect as she was the one dispossessed and thus, she can file the action for forcible entry. Any judgment rendered by the courts below in the forcible entry action will bind and definitely affect her claim to possess the subject property.  The fact that Valeriana is not the holder of the Certificate of Stewardship is not in issue in a forcible entry case.  This matter already delves into the character of her possession. We emphasize that in ejectment suits, it does not even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable (Valeriana Villondo Vs. Carmen Quijano, et al., G.R. No. 173606. December 3, 2012).

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service

We have previously ruled that an ocular inspection without notice to nor presence of the parties is highly improper. Good and noble intentions notwithstanding, Judge  Dacanay’s  actuations  gave  an  appearance  of impropriety.  His behavior diminished public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 

Judge  Dacanay’s  ocular  inspection  without  notice  to  the  parties constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation of  Canon  4  of  the  New  Code  of  Judicial  Conduct  for  the  Philippine Judiciary.  

Conditional Judgment

Obviously, the language employed by the CA made the judgment conditional.  The return of the amount of P500,000.00 should not depend on the happening of a future event. Whether or not a loan is obtained by petitioners, respondents are liable to pay the amount of P500,000.00 as actual damages.  Thus, the dispositive portion of  the CA Decision should be  modified by ordering respondents to pay actual  damages in the amount of P500,000.00, without any condition (Albert M. Ching, et al. Vs. Felix M. Bantolo, et al., G.R. No. 177086. December 5, 2012).

Exemplary Damages

Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed “by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the

moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.”  They are, however, not recoverable as a matter of right. They are awarded only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

 

In this case, we agree with the CA that although the revocation was done in bad faith, respondents did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.  They revoked the SPA because they were not satisfied with the amount of the loan approved.  Thus, petitioners are not entitled to exemplary damages (Albert M. Ching, et al. Vs. Felix M. Bantolo, et al., G.R. No. 177086. December 5, 2012).

Medical Certificate

The aforesaid medical reports/evaluations/certifications of different doctors in favor of petitioner cannot be given probative value and their contents cannot be deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein.  It must be stressed that a document or writing which is admitted not as independent evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts related therein. In the same vein, the medical certificate which was identified and interpreted in court by another doctor was not accorded probative value because the doctor who prepared it was not presented for its identification.  Similarly, in this case, since the doctors who examined petitioner were not presented to testify on their findings, the medical certificates issued on their behalf and identified by another doctor cannot be admitted as evidence.  Since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. Thus, an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value.  It is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed.  Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents.  Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect and of no probative value (Dr. Genevieve L. Huang Vs. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 180440. December 5, 2012).