Official Ballot; Revision of Ballots

We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes that the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise “official ballots” that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369.  As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.

It should be pointed out, however, that the provision in question is couched  in  the  permissive  term  "may"  instead  of  the  mandatory  word "shall."  Therefore,  it  is  merely  directory,  and  the  HRET is  not  without authority to opt to proceed with the revision of ballots in the remaining contested precincts even if there was no reasonable recovery made by the protestant in the initial revision (Liwayway Vinzons-Chato Vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Elmer E. Panotes/Elmer E. Panotes Vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Liwayway Vinzons-Chato, G.R. No. 199149/G.R. No. 201350. January 22, 2013).

Acceptance by Corporation

Even assuming that the bank officer or employee whom petitioner claimed he had talked to regarding the March 22, 1984 letter had acceded to his own modified terms for the repurchase, their supposed verbal exchange did not bind respondent bank in view of its corporate nature.  There was no evidence that said Mr. Lazaro or Mr. Fajardo was authorized by respondent bank’s Board of Directors to accept petitioner’s counter-proposal to repurchase the foreclosed properties at the price and terms other than those communicated in the March 22, 1984 letter (Heirs of Fausto C. Ignacio Vs. Home Bankers Savings and Trust co., et al., G.R. No. 177783. January 23, 2013).

Expropriation

The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been violated.  It is a judicial function that cannot “be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.” Thus, we have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof.

Notably, in all these cases, Napocor likewise argued that it is liable to pay the property owners for the easement of right-of-way only  and not the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines.  But we uniformly held in those cases that since  the high-tension electric current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value of their property. 

In Republic v. Santos, we ruled that a commissioners’ land valuation which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court (National Power Corporation Vs. Spouses Rodolfo Zabala and Lilia Baylon, G.R. No. 173520. January 30, 2013).