Complaint by Offended Party

Except in cases that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness, a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary for the institution of a criminal action.  The Information filed by the prosecutor with the proper court is sufficient.

 

A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines.  The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the prosecution of crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor need not be filed by the “offended party” but may be filed by any competent person, unless the offense subject thereof cannot be prosecuted de oficio (ELISEO R. FRANCISCO, JR., v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 177720, February 18, 2009).

Prevented from Leaving

In Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc.,  the Court held that the employment contract did not commence when the petitioner therein, a hired seaman, was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire; thus, no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties.   

Nevertheless, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party.   If the reverse happened, that is, the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

Petitioners’ act of preventing respondent from leaving and complying with his contract of employment constitutes breach of contract for which petitioner BMC is liable for actual damages to respondent for the loss of one-year salary as provided in the contract (Bright Maritime Corporation (BMC) / Desiree P. Tenorio Vs. Ricardo B. Fantonial, G.R. No. 165935. February 8, 2012).

Twin Notice Rule

Here, PDGCC complied with the “two-notice rule” stated above. PDGCC complied with the first notice requirement, i.e. notice informing the petitioner of his infractions, as shown by the following: (1) the Memorandum dated September 27, 2005 sent by Cruz to the petitioner requiring the latter to explain and to submit his report on the additional compensation he received from COMELEC; and (2) the letter dated December 9, 2005 sent by Cruz to the petitioner requiring him to explain 
why he allowed the EGB Security Investigation and General Services, Inc. to render services to the condominium.

The second notice requirement was likewise complied with by PDGCC when it sent to the petitioner the Memorandum dated October 28, 2006 which, in essence, informed the latter that a new Building Administrator had been appointed. It was stated in the said Memorandum that the decision to appoint a new Building Administrator was due to the fact that the PDGCC Board of Directors found the petitioner’s explanation to the charges against him unsatisfactory (Sebastian F. Oasay, Jr. Vs. Palacio del Gobernador Condominium Corporation and Omar T. Cruz, G.R. No. 194306. February 6, 2012).

Deficiency in Foreclosure Sale

Furthermore, we have also ruled in Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that, in deference to the rule that a mortgage is simply a security and cannot be considered payment of an outstanding obligation, the creditor is not barred from recovering the deficiency even if it bought the mortgaged property at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at a lower price than its market value notwithstanding the fact that said value is more than or equal to the total amount of the debtor’s obligation (Bank of the Philippine Islands, as successor-in-Interest of Far Far East Bank & Trust Company Vs. Cythia L. Reyes,  G.R. No. 182769. February 1, 2012).

Malicious Intent

The mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People, the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial court’s finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: “Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility … [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent … the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent.” Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that “as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil.” In People v. Carmen,  the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima – under the guise of a “ritual or treatment” – plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of “nervous breakdown” by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial court’s finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof  (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al.,
G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Failure to Prosecute

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.  On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.  Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases – a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. Thus, we held:

The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already. (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al.,
G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Hazing

Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional “rounds” on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other “weapon” was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of “traditional” initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. 

Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries. (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al.,
G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Por Viaje Contract

Textually, the provision that: “NA ako ay sumasang-ayon na maglingkod at gumawa ng mga gawain sang-ayon sa patakarang “por viaje” na magmumula sa pagalis sa Navotas papunta sa pangisdaan at pagbabalik sa pondohan ng lantsa sa Navotas, Metro Manila” is for a fixed period of employment.  In the context, however, of the facts that:  (1) the respondents were doing tasks necessarily to Lynvil’s fishing business with positions ranging from captain of the vessel to bodegero; (2) after the end of a trip, they will again be hired for another trip with new contracts; and (3) this arrangement continued for more than ten years, the clear intention is to go around the security of tenure of the respondents as regular employees.  

The same set of circumstances indicate clearly enough that it was the need for a continued source of income that forced the employees’ acceptance of the “por viaje” provision (Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. and/or Rosendo S. De Borja Vs. Andres G. Ariola, et al., G.R. No. 181974. February 1, 2012).

Criminal Case vis-a-vis Labor Case

In Nicolas v. National Labor Relations Commission,  we held that a criminal conviction is not necessary to find just cause for employment termination. Otherwise stated, an employee’s acquittal in a criminal case, especially one that is grounded on the existence of reasonable doubt, will not preclude a determination in a labor case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the employer’s interests. In the reverse, the finding of probable cause is not followed by automatic adoption of such finding by the labor tribunals. (Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. and/or Rosendo S. De Borja Vs. Andres G. Ariola, et al., G.R. No. 181974. February 1, 2012).

Treachery

We can not presume that treachery was present merely from the fact that the attack was sudden. The suddenness of an attack, does not of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental. . . .” (People of the Philippines Vs. Vicente Vilbar @ "Dikit",  G.R. No. 186541. February 1, 2012).