Preliminary Mandatory Injunction

Based on the foregoing disquisition, we find that the RTC had sufficient bases to issue the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as all the requisites for the issuance of such writ were established.  We agree with the RTC that respondent has a right to recover the five titles because petitioner failed to comply with his obligation to respondent.  It bears stressing that respondent was compelled to directly pay CMC to avoid the foreclosure of the  chattel mortgages, which respondent executed in favor of CMC.   Considering that respondent has paid most, if not all, of its obligations to CMC, there is no reason for petitioner to hold on to the titles (Goerge S. H. Sy, etc. Vs. Autobus Transport System, Inc., G.R. No. 176898. December 3, 2012).

Real Party in Interest - Forcible Entry

Notably, even public lands can be the subject of forcible entry cases as it has already been held that ejectment proceedings may involve all kinds of land. Thus, in the case at bench, while the parties are fighting over the possession of a government land, the courts below are not deprived of jurisdiction to render judgment thereon. Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suit are mere informal settlers.

Sans the presence of the awardee of the Certificate of Stewardship, the provision clearly allows Valeriana to institute the action for the recovery of the physical possession of the property against the alleged usurper.  She has a right or interest to protect as she was the one dispossessed and thus, she can file the action for forcible entry. Any judgment rendered by the courts below in the forcible entry action will bind and definitely affect her claim to possess the subject property.  The fact that Valeriana is not the holder of the Certificate of Stewardship is not in issue in a forcible entry case.  This matter already delves into the character of her possession. We emphasize that in ejectment suits, it does not even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable (Valeriana Villondo Vs. Carmen Quijano, et al., G.R. No. 173606. December 3, 2012).

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service

We have previously ruled that an ocular inspection without notice to nor presence of the parties is highly improper. Good and noble intentions notwithstanding, Judge  Dacanay’s  actuations  gave  an  appearance  of impropriety.  His behavior diminished public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 

Judge  Dacanay’s  ocular  inspection  without  notice  to  the  parties constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation of  Canon  4  of  the  New  Code  of  Judicial  Conduct  for  the  Philippine Judiciary.  

Conditional Judgment

Obviously, the language employed by the CA made the judgment conditional.  The return of the amount of P500,000.00 should not depend on the happening of a future event. Whether or not a loan is obtained by petitioners, respondents are liable to pay the amount of P500,000.00 as actual damages.  Thus, the dispositive portion of  the CA Decision should be  modified by ordering respondents to pay actual  damages in the amount of P500,000.00, without any condition (Albert M. Ching, et al. Vs. Felix M. Bantolo, et al., G.R. No. 177086. December 5, 2012).

Exemplary Damages

Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed “by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the

moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.”  They are, however, not recoverable as a matter of right. They are awarded only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

 

In this case, we agree with the CA that although the revocation was done in bad faith, respondents did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.  They revoked the SPA because they were not satisfied with the amount of the loan approved.  Thus, petitioners are not entitled to exemplary damages (Albert M. Ching, et al. Vs. Felix M. Bantolo, et al., G.R. No. 177086. December 5, 2012).

Medical Certificate

The aforesaid medical reports/evaluations/certifications of different doctors in favor of petitioner cannot be given probative value and their contents cannot be deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein.  It must be stressed that a document or writing which is admitted not as independent evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts related therein. In the same vein, the medical certificate which was identified and interpreted in court by another doctor was not accorded probative value because the doctor who prepared it was not presented for its identification.  Similarly, in this case, since the doctors who examined petitioner were not presented to testify on their findings, the medical certificates issued on their behalf and identified by another doctor cannot be admitted as evidence.  Since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. Thus, an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value.  It is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed.  Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents.  Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect and of no probative value (Dr. Genevieve L. Huang Vs. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 180440. December 5, 2012).

Complaint by Offended Party

Except in cases that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness, a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary for the institution of a criminal action.  The Information filed by the prosecutor with the proper court is sufficient.

 

A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines.  The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the prosecution of crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor need not be filed by the “offended party” but may be filed by any competent person, unless the offense subject thereof cannot be prosecuted de oficio (ELISEO R. FRANCISCO, JR., v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 177720, February 18, 2009).

Prevented from Leaving

In Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc.,  the Court held that the employment contract did not commence when the petitioner therein, a hired seaman, was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire; thus, no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties.   

Nevertheless, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party.   If the reverse happened, that is, the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

Petitioners’ act of preventing respondent from leaving and complying with his contract of employment constitutes breach of contract for which petitioner BMC is liable for actual damages to respondent for the loss of one-year salary as provided in the contract (Bright Maritime Corporation (BMC) / Desiree P. Tenorio Vs. Ricardo B. Fantonial, G.R. No. 165935. February 8, 2012).

Twin Notice Rule

Here, PDGCC complied with the “two-notice rule” stated above. PDGCC complied with the first notice requirement, i.e. notice informing the petitioner of his infractions, as shown by the following: (1) the Memorandum dated September 27, 2005 sent by Cruz to the petitioner requiring the latter to explain and to submit his report on the additional compensation he received from COMELEC; and (2) the letter dated December 9, 2005 sent by Cruz to the petitioner requiring him to explain 
why he allowed the EGB Security Investigation and General Services, Inc. to render services to the condominium.

The second notice requirement was likewise complied with by PDGCC when it sent to the petitioner the Memorandum dated October 28, 2006 which, in essence, informed the latter that a new Building Administrator had been appointed. It was stated in the said Memorandum that the decision to appoint a new Building Administrator was due to the fact that the PDGCC Board of Directors found the petitioner’s explanation to the charges against him unsatisfactory (Sebastian F. Oasay, Jr. Vs. Palacio del Gobernador Condominium Corporation and Omar T. Cruz, G.R. No. 194306. February 6, 2012).

Deficiency in Foreclosure Sale

Furthermore, we have also ruled in Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that, in deference to the rule that a mortgage is simply a security and cannot be considered payment of an outstanding obligation, the creditor is not barred from recovering the deficiency even if it bought the mortgaged property at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at a lower price than its market value notwithstanding the fact that said value is more than or equal to the total amount of the debtor’s obligation (Bank of the Philippine Islands, as successor-in-Interest of Far Far East Bank & Trust Company Vs. Cythia L. Reyes,  G.R. No. 182769. February 1, 2012).

Malicious Intent

The mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People, the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial court’s finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: “Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility … [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent … the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent.” Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that “as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil.” In People v. Carmen,  the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima – under the guise of a “ritual or treatment” – plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of “nervous breakdown” by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial court’s finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof  (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al.,
G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Failure to Prosecute

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.  On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.  Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases – a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. Thus, we held:

The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already. (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al.,
G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Hazing

Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional “rounds” on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other “weapon” was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of “traditional” initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. 

Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries. (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al.,
G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Por Viaje Contract

Textually, the provision that: “NA ako ay sumasang-ayon na maglingkod at gumawa ng mga gawain sang-ayon sa patakarang “por viaje” na magmumula sa pagalis sa Navotas papunta sa pangisdaan at pagbabalik sa pondohan ng lantsa sa Navotas, Metro Manila” is for a fixed period of employment.  In the context, however, of the facts that:  (1) the respondents were doing tasks necessarily to Lynvil’s fishing business with positions ranging from captain of the vessel to bodegero; (2) after the end of a trip, they will again be hired for another trip with new contracts; and (3) this arrangement continued for more than ten years, the clear intention is to go around the security of tenure of the respondents as regular employees.  

The same set of circumstances indicate clearly enough that it was the need for a continued source of income that forced the employees’ acceptance of the “por viaje” provision (Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. and/or Rosendo S. De Borja Vs. Andres G. Ariola, et al., G.R. No. 181974. February 1, 2012).

Criminal Case vis-a-vis Labor Case

In Nicolas v. National Labor Relations Commission,  we held that a criminal conviction is not necessary to find just cause for employment termination. Otherwise stated, an employee’s acquittal in a criminal case, especially one that is grounded on the existence of reasonable doubt, will not preclude a determination in a labor case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the employer’s interests. In the reverse, the finding of probable cause is not followed by automatic adoption of such finding by the labor tribunals. (Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. and/or Rosendo S. De Borja Vs. Andres G. Ariola, et al., G.R. No. 181974. February 1, 2012).

Treachery

We can not presume that treachery was present merely from the fact that the attack was sudden. The suddenness of an attack, does not of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental. . . .” (People of the Philippines Vs. Vicente Vilbar @ "Dikit",  G.R. No. 186541. February 1, 2012).

Termination of All Employees

In the aforecited case of Betoy, the Court upheld the policy of the Executive to terminate all the employees of the office before rehiring those necessary for its operation (United Claimant Association of NEA (Unican) etc., et al. Vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), et al., G.R. No. 187107. January 31, 2012).

Presence of Counsel in Promulgation

There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on both accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced (Marino B. Icdan Vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 185960. January 25, 2012).

Quasi-Delict

Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that night, Antonio should have been prudent to reduce his speed and increase his distance from the Pathfinder. Had he done so, it would be improbable for him to have hit the vehicle in front of him or if he really could not avoid hitting it, prevent such extensive wreck to the vehicle in front. With the glaring evidence, he obviously failed to exercise proper care in his driving.

Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury the truck registered under it have caused (Crix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (Formerly Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance) Vs. Minors: Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and Marikris, All surnamed Mangalinao y Dizon, et al. Sonny Li and Antonio Delos Santos Vs. Minors: Dennis, Mylene, Melanie and Marikris, All Surnamed Mangalinao Y Dizon, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 174089. January 25, 2012).

Refused to Receive

In Bughaw v. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation, this Court, in verifying the veracity of the allegation that respondent refused to receive the Notice of Termination, essentially looked for the following: (1) affidavit of service stating the reason for failure to serve the notice upon the recipient; and (2) a notation to that effect, which shall be written on the notice itself (Mansion Printing Center and Clement Cheng Vs. Diosdado Bitara, Jr., G.R. No. 168120. January 25, 2012).

Valid Dismissal - Conviction

The petitioner’s argument is not novel. It has been raised and rejected many times before on the basis that neither conviction beyond reasonable doubt for a crime against the employer nor acquittal after criminal prosecution was indispensable. Nor was a formal charge in court for the acts prejudicial to the interest of the employer a pre-requisite for a valid dismissal (Lolita S. Concepcion Vs. Minex Import Corporation/Minerama Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 153569. January 24, 2012).

Supervisory Power of RTC - Quashal of Writ of Execution

Neither can We affirm petitioner's contention that in seeking the quashal of the writ of possession, the respondents were, in effect, asking the RTC to abrogate its decision, which had already attained finality. As correctly observed by the CA, the quashal of a writ of possession does not have the effect of modifying or abrogating the judgment of the RTC. “The settled rule is that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and hence may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes – all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest.” To reiterate, however, the court's power with regard to execution of judgments extends only to properties irrefutably belonging to the judgment debtor, which does not obtain in this case.

Therefore, petitioner's contention that the writ of possession had already been enforced and can no longer be quashed deserves scant consideration. Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory control over the entire execution process, and such authority carries with it the right to determine every question which may be invariably involved in the execution. Respondents invoked this supervisory power when they sought the quashal of the writ of possession (Vashdeo Gagoomal Vs. Spouses Ramon and Natividad Villacorta, G.R. No. 192813. January 18, 2012).

Lis Pendens

The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a dual effect: (1) to keep the property subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or otherwise, of the property subject of the litigation to the judgment that the court will subsequently promulgate.

Thus, a notice of lis pendens is only valid and effective when it affects title over or right of possession of a real property.

In this case, it cannot be denied that Civil Case No. 67381, which RAM, predecessor-in-interest of petitioner, instituted against Zeñarosa was for collection of sum of money with damages – a purely personal action. Hence, the notice of lis pendens in favor of RAM annotated on the cancelled TCT No. 170213 and carried over to Tan's TCT No. 10206 conferred upon it no rights over the subject property and, as a necessary consequence, upon petitioner, its successor-in-interest (Vashdeo Gagoomal Vs. Spouses Ramon and Natividad Villacorta, G.R. No. 192813. January 18, 2012).

Sufficiency of Allegation in Information

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their bodies “which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations (People of the Philippines Vs. PO2 Eduardo Valdez & Edwin Valdez, G.R. No. 175602. January 18, 2012).

Chain of Custody

A review of the records establishes that the aforestated procedure laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR was not followed. Several lapses on the part of the buy-bust team are readily apparent. To start with, no photograph of the seized shabu was taken. Secondly, the buy-bust team did not immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the crime and in the presence of Relato and witnesses. Thirdly, although there was testimony about the marking of the seized items being made at the police station, the records do not show that the marking was done in the presence of Relato or his chosen representative. And, fourthly, no representative of the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected official attended the taking of the physical inventory and to sign the inventory.

While the last paragraph of Section 21(a) of the IRR provides a saving mechanism to ensure that not every case of non-compliance irreversibly prejudices the State’s evidence, it is significant to note that the application of the saving mechanism to a situation is expressly conditioned upon the State rendering an explanation of the lapse or lapses in the compliance with the procedures.¹³ Here, however, the Prosecution tendered no explanation why the buy-bust team had failed to mark the seized shabu immediately after the arrest. Nevertheless, even assuming that marking the shabu at the scene of the crime by the buy-bust team had not been practical or possible for the buy-bust team to do, the saving mechanism would still not be applicable due to the lack of a credible showing of any effort undertaken by the buy-bust team to keep the shabu intact while in transit to the police station (People of the Philippines Vs. Darwin Relato y Ajero, G.R. No. 173794. January 18, 2012).

Animus Possidendi

Upon the State’s presenting to the trial court of the facts and circumstances from which to infer the existence ofanimus possidendi, it becomes incumbent upon the Defense to rebut the inference with evidence that the accused did not exercise power and control of the illicit thing in question, and did not intend to do so. For that purpose, a mere unfounded assertion of the accused that he did not know that he had possession of the illegal drug is insufficient, and animus possidendi is then presumed to exist on his part because he was thereby shown to have performed an act that the law prohibited and punished.

It cannot be disputed that Delos Santos had animus possidendi. His conduct prior to and following his apprehension evinced his guilty knowledge of the contents of the gift-wrapped box as shabu. His uncorroborated story of having been summoned to help in the cleaning of Unit 706 was a sham excuse that he peddled to explain his presence in the Somerset Condominium. His explanation was useless, however, because he was no longer employed as a janitor of the Somerset Condominium at the time of his arrest after being already terminated from employment. Correlatively, his willingness to run for Wilson the errand of delivering the gift-wrapped box to the unnamed person near the Jollibee Vito Cruz extension branch proved that he was serving as a courier of shabu. Besides, his guilty knowledge was confirmed by his unreasonable refusal to exit from Unit 706 despite the demand of the NBI agents to do so, and by his stealthy transfer to the adjoining Unit 705. Had he been truly innocent, he would have voluntarily cooperated with the NBI agents instead of attempting to escape from them (People of the Philippines Vs. Geron Delos Santos y Maristela, G.R. No. 170839. January 18, 2012).

Self-Defense

Nonetheless, even if we were to believe Arnold and Joven’s version of the incident, the element of unlawful aggression by the victims would still be lacking. The allegation that one of the victims had held Winifreda’s hand did not indicate that the act had gravely endangered Winifreda’s life. Similarly, the victims’ supposed motion to draw something from their waists did not put Arnold and Joven’s lives in any actual or imminent danger. What the records inform us is that Arnold and Joven did not actually see if the victims had any weapons to draw from their waists. That no weapons belonging to the victims were recovered from the crime scene confirmed their being unarmed. Lastly, had they been only defending themselves, Arnold and Joven did not tell the trial court why they had repeatedly hacked their victims with their bolos; or why they did not themselves even sustain any physical injury (People of the Philippines Vs. Melanio Del Castillo y Vargas, et al., G.R. No. 169084. January 18, 2012).

Quitclaim

While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties. Considering the petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.

While the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into signing the release and waiver, his failure to present evidence renders his allegation self-serving and inutile to invalidate the same. That no portion of his retirement pay will be released to him or his urgent need for funds does not constitute the pressure or coercion contemplated by law.

That the petitioner was all set to return to his hometown and was in dire need of money would likewise not qualify as undue pressure sufficient to invalidate the quitclaim. "Dire necessity" may be an acceptable ground to annul quitclaims if the consideration is unconscionably low and the employee was tricked into accepting it, but is not an acceptable ground for annulling the release when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to execute it. While it is our duty to prevent the exploitation of employees, it also behooves us to protect the sanctity of contracts that do not contravene our laws.

The petitioner is not an ordinary laborer. He is mature, intelligent and educated with a college degree, who cannot be easily duped or tricked into performing an act against his will. As no proof was presented that the said quitclaim was entered into through fraud, deception, misrepresentation, the same is valid and binding. The petitioner is estopped from questioning the said quitclaim and cannot renege after accepting the benefits thereunder. This Court will never satisfy itself with surmises, conjectures or speculations for the purpose of giving imprimatur to the petitioner's attempt to abdicate from his obligations under a valid and binding release and waiver.

The petitioner's educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. This Court cannot permit the petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and understanding thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that the petitioner allowed to lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention (Hypte R. Aujero Vs. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation, G.R. No. 193484. January 18, 2012).

Effect of Novation to BP22

Anent the petitioner’s contention that novation had extinguished his criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22, we likewise find the same utterly specious. The petitioner ought to be reminded that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. As astutely opined by the CA, novation may only prevent the rise of criminal liability if it occurs prior to the filing of the Information in court. In other words, novation does not extinguish criminal liability but may only prevent its rise (Edgardo Medalla Vs. Resurreccion D. Laxa, G.R. No. 193362. January 18, 2012).

Issues Elevated on Appeal

In this respect, the NLRC cannot be accused of grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 4(c), Rule VI of the NLRC Rules, the NLRC shall limit itself to reviewing and deciding only the issues that were elevated on appeal. The NLRC, while not totally bound by technical rules of procedure, is not licensed to disregard and violate the implementing rules it implemented.

Nonetheless, technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Technical rules are not binding in labor cases and are not to be applied strictly if the result would be detrimental to the working man. This Court may choose not to encumber itself with technicalities and limitations consequent to procedural rules if such will only serve as a hindrance to its duty to decide cases judiciously and in a manner that would put an end with finality to all existing conflicts between the parties (Timoteo H. Sarona Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Roayle Security Agency, et al., G.R. No. 185280. January 18, 2012).

Appeal Despite Finality of Decision

The finality of the NLRC’s decision does not preclude the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. That the NLRC issues an entry of judgment after the lapse of ten (10) days from the parties’ receipt of its decision will only give rise to the prevailing party’s right to move for the execution thereof but will not prevent the CA from taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations (Timoteo H. Sarona Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Roayle Security Agency, et al., G.R. No. 185280. January 18, 2012).

Earnest Money

The P100,000.00 that was given to Msgr. Cirilos as “deposit” cannot be considered as earnest money. Where the parties merely exchanged offers and counter-offers, no contract is perfected since they did not yet give their consent to such offers. Earnest money applies to a perfected sale (Starbright Sales Eterprises, Inc. Vs. Philippine Realty Corporation, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, et al., G.R. No. 177936. January 18, 2012)

Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping

A reading of respondents’ verification reveals that they complied with the abovequoted procedural rule. Respondents confirmed that they had read the allegations in the Complaint which were true and correct based on their personal knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of our own personal knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being sufficient that the respondents declared that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct based on their personal knowledge.

As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a reading of respondents’ Verification/Certification reveals that they, in fact, certified therein that they have not commenced any similar action before any other court or tribunal and to the best of their knowledge no such other action is pending therein. The only missing statement is respondents' undertaking that if they should thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, they shall report such fact to the court. This, notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance on the part of respondents (Georgia T. Estel Vs. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., namely, Recaredo Jr., Roline, Ramel, Rhoel, and Ruby, all surnamed Diego,
G.R. No. 174082. January 16, 2011).

Tort

If the passenger’s cause of action against the airline company is premised onculpa aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline company’s agent, there must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its agent (Sps. Fernando and Lourdes Viloria Vs. Continental Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 188288. January 16, 2011).

Increase in Interest Rate

It is the contention of the appellee that he has the right to suspend payments since the increase in interest rate imposed by defendant-appellant FDC is not valid and therefore cannot be given legal effect. Although Section II, paragraph d of the Contract to Sell entered into by the parties states that, “should there be an increase in bank interest rate for loans and/or other financial accommodations, the rate of interest provided for in this contract shall be automatically amended to equal the said increased bank interest rate, the date of said amendment to coincide with the date of said increase in interest rate,” the said increase still needs to [be] accompanied by valid proofs and not one of the parties must unilaterally alter what was originally agreed upon. However, FDC failed to substantiate the alleged increase with sufficient proof (Fedman Development Corporation Vs. Federico Agcaoili, G.R. No. 165025. August 31, 2011).