Forum Shopping

Moreover, this Court has constantly held that the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.

The grave mischief sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping, i.e., the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions, is well-nigh palpable in this case. If the Muntinlupa RTC were to rule that Michelle was entitled to a Protection Order, this would necessarily conflict with any order or decision from the Makati RTC granting Juan Ignacio visitation rights over Ava and Ara. As aptly pointed out by Juan Ignacio in his Comment such a conflict had already occurred, as the TPO issued by the Muntinlupa RTC actually conflicted with the Orders issued by the Makati RTC granting Juan Ignacio temporary visitation rights over his children. There now exists an Order from the Muntinlupa RTC which, among others, directed Juan Ignacio to stay at least one (1) kilometer away from Ava and Ara, even as the Makati RTC recognized, in two (2) separate Orders, that he had the right, albeit temporarily to see his children (Michelle Lana Brown-Araneta, et al. Vs. Juan Ignacio Araneta, G.R. No. 190814. October 9, 2013).

Registration of Unregistered Land

Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice to a third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded (Spouses Celemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. and Ma. Rosario M. Sabitsana Vs. Juanito F. Muertegui, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Domingo A. Muertegui, Jr., G.R. No. 181359. August 5, 2013).

Destructive Arson v. Simple Arson

P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson (People of the Philippines Vs. Alamanda Macabando, G.R. No. 188708. July 31, 2013). 

Reconstitution - Jurisdictional Requirements

Verily, while the CA invoked the appropriate provisions of R.A. No.  26, it failed, however, to take note that Section 9 thereof mandatorily requires that the notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title and the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title. In this case, the RTC failed to indicate these jurisdictional facts in the notice.

While it is true that notices need not be sent to the adjoining owners in this case since this is not required under Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 26 as enunciated in our ruling in Puzon, it is imperative, however, that the notice should specify the names of said interested parties so named in the title sought to be reconstituted. No less than Section 9 of R.A. No. 26 mandates it.

In view of these lapses, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction to proceed with the case since the mandatory manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by R.A. No. 26 had not been strictly followed, thereby rendering the proceedings utterly null and void (Republic v. Camacho, G.R. No. 185604. June 13, 2013).

Separation Pay

In the subsequent case of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was further elucidated that “in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee.” In Reno Foods, Inc, v. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan,  the Court wrote that “separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee’s fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause.” (Unilever Philippines, Inc. Vs. Maria Ruby M. Rivera, G.R. No. 201701. June 3, 2013).

Official Ballot; Revision of Ballots

We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes that the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise “official ballots” that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369.  As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.

It should be pointed out, however, that the provision in question is couched  in  the  permissive  term  "may"  instead  of  the  mandatory  word "shall."  Therefore,  it  is  merely  directory,  and  the  HRET is  not  without authority to opt to proceed with the revision of ballots in the remaining contested precincts even if there was no reasonable recovery made by the protestant in the initial revision (Liwayway Vinzons-Chato Vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Elmer E. Panotes/Elmer E. Panotes Vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Liwayway Vinzons-Chato, G.R. No. 199149/G.R. No. 201350. January 22, 2013).

Acceptance by Corporation

Even assuming that the bank officer or employee whom petitioner claimed he had talked to regarding the March 22, 1984 letter had acceded to his own modified terms for the repurchase, their supposed verbal exchange did not bind respondent bank in view of its corporate nature.  There was no evidence that said Mr. Lazaro or Mr. Fajardo was authorized by respondent bank’s Board of Directors to accept petitioner’s counter-proposal to repurchase the foreclosed properties at the price and terms other than those communicated in the March 22, 1984 letter (Heirs of Fausto C. Ignacio Vs. Home Bankers Savings and Trust co., et al., G.R. No. 177783. January 23, 2013).

Expropriation

The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been violated.  It is a judicial function that cannot “be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.” Thus, we have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof.

Notably, in all these cases, Napocor likewise argued that it is liable to pay the property owners for the easement of right-of-way only  and not the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines.  But we uniformly held in those cases that since  the high-tension electric current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value of their property. 

In Republic v. Santos, we ruled that a commissioners’ land valuation which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court (National Power Corporation Vs. Spouses Rodolfo Zabala and Lilia Baylon, G.R. No. 173520. January 30, 2013).

Unlawful Aggression

Granting that the victim tried to steal the petitioner’s car battery, such did not equate to a danger in his life or personal safety.  At one point during the fight, Macario even tried to run away from his assailant, yet the petitioner continued to chase the victim and, using his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the mortal wound on his chest.  Contrary to the petitioner’s defense, there then appeared to be no “real danger to his life or personal safety,” for no unlawful aggression, which would have otherwise justified him in inflicting the gunshot wounds for his defense, emanated from Macario’s end (Ramon Josue y Gonzales Vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 199579. December 10, 2012).

Right of Alien Spouse over Conjugal Land

In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied a claim  for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into

Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.

Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the  prohibition  is  to  conserve  the  national  patrimony and  it  is  this  policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect (Willem Beumer Vs. Avelina Amores, G.R. No. 195670. December 3, 2012).

Forum Shopping

In the present case, HFC did not commit forum shopping because the third element of litis pendentia is lacking.  As previously mentioned, the DARAB’s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party.  The courts, in this case, the SAC, will still have to review with finality the determination, in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. Thus, it becomes clear that there is no identity between the two cases such that a judgment by the DARAB, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the case before the SAC (Land Bank of the Philippines Vs. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, G.R. No. 166259. November 12, 2012).

Post-Employment Medical Examination

While the mandatory reporting requirement obliges the seafarer  to be present  for the postemployment medical examination, which must be conducted within three (3) working days upon the seafarer’s return, it also poses the employer the implied obligation to conduct a meaningful and timely examination of the seafarer (Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., et al. Vs. Salvadors T. Serna, G.R. No. 172086. December 3, 2012).

Ship Logbook

At any rate, we effectively stated in Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission (First Division) that the Court does not deem a logbook to be a comprehensive and exclusive record of all the incidents in a vessel (Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., et al. Vs. Salvadors T. Serna, G.R. No. 172086. December 3, 2012).

State Witness

Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, Mallari’s credibility was not adversely affected by his non-inclusion as an accused in the Information.  This was not an attempt to escape criminal liability.  Rather, the prosecution merely availed of its legal option to immediately utilize him as a state witness instead of undergoing the judicial procedure of charging him as a co-conspirator then moving for his discharge as a witness (Ricky Marquez, et al. Vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181138. December 3, 2012).

Preliminary Mandatory Injunction

Based on the foregoing disquisition, we find that the RTC had sufficient bases to issue the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as all the requisites for the issuance of such writ were established.  We agree with the RTC that respondent has a right to recover the five titles because petitioner failed to comply with his obligation to respondent.  It bears stressing that respondent was compelled to directly pay CMC to avoid the foreclosure of the  chattel mortgages, which respondent executed in favor of CMC.   Considering that respondent has paid most, if not all, of its obligations to CMC, there is no reason for petitioner to hold on to the titles (Goerge S. H. Sy, etc. Vs. Autobus Transport System, Inc., G.R. No. 176898. December 3, 2012).

Real Party in Interest - Forcible Entry

Notably, even public lands can be the subject of forcible entry cases as it has already been held that ejectment proceedings may involve all kinds of land. Thus, in the case at bench, while the parties are fighting over the possession of a government land, the courts below are not deprived of jurisdiction to render judgment thereon. Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suit are mere informal settlers.

Sans the presence of the awardee of the Certificate of Stewardship, the provision clearly allows Valeriana to institute the action for the recovery of the physical possession of the property against the alleged usurper.  She has a right or interest to protect as she was the one dispossessed and thus, she can file the action for forcible entry. Any judgment rendered by the courts below in the forcible entry action will bind and definitely affect her claim to possess the subject property.  The fact that Valeriana is not the holder of the Certificate of Stewardship is not in issue in a forcible entry case.  This matter already delves into the character of her possession. We emphasize that in ejectment suits, it does not even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable (Valeriana Villondo Vs. Carmen Quijano, et al., G.R. No. 173606. December 3, 2012).

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service

We have previously ruled that an ocular inspection without notice to nor presence of the parties is highly improper. Good and noble intentions notwithstanding, Judge  Dacanay’s  actuations  gave  an  appearance  of impropriety.  His behavior diminished public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 

Judge  Dacanay’s  ocular  inspection  without  notice  to  the  parties constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation of  Canon  4  of  the  New  Code  of  Judicial  Conduct  for  the  Philippine Judiciary.  

Conditional Judgment

Obviously, the language employed by the CA made the judgment conditional.  The return of the amount of P500,000.00 should not depend on the happening of a future event. Whether or not a loan is obtained by petitioners, respondents are liable to pay the amount of P500,000.00 as actual damages.  Thus, the dispositive portion of  the CA Decision should be  modified by ordering respondents to pay actual  damages in the amount of P500,000.00, without any condition (Albert M. Ching, et al. Vs. Felix M. Bantolo, et al., G.R. No. 177086. December 5, 2012).

Exemplary Damages

Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed “by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the

moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.”  They are, however, not recoverable as a matter of right. They are awarded only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

 

In this case, we agree with the CA that although the revocation was done in bad faith, respondents did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.  They revoked the SPA because they were not satisfied with the amount of the loan approved.  Thus, petitioners are not entitled to exemplary damages (Albert M. Ching, et al. Vs. Felix M. Bantolo, et al., G.R. No. 177086. December 5, 2012).

Medical Certificate

The aforesaid medical reports/evaluations/certifications of different doctors in favor of petitioner cannot be given probative value and their contents cannot be deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein.  It must be stressed that a document or writing which is admitted not as independent evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts related therein. In the same vein, the medical certificate which was identified and interpreted in court by another doctor was not accorded probative value because the doctor who prepared it was not presented for its identification.  Similarly, in this case, since the doctors who examined petitioner were not presented to testify on their findings, the medical certificates issued on their behalf and identified by another doctor cannot be admitted as evidence.  Since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. Thus, an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value.  It is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed.  Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents.  Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect and of no probative value (Dr. Genevieve L. Huang Vs. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 180440. December 5, 2012).